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The thesis of this article is that in performing the
function of judicial review, the Supreme Court of the
United States of America acts as a relatively autonomous
institution. While generally promoting the interests of
United States-style democratic capitalism' and its power
* Thomas Kleven is a professor of law at Thurgood Mar-
shall School of Law, Texas Southern University. An earlier ver-
sion of this article was presented at the Marxist Scholars' Con-
ference at Berkeley, November 1987.
1. By the term "United States-style democratic capitalism,"
I mean to imply two features of the system being discussed.
First, a similarity exists between the United States and other
democratic capitalist societies in that all are private-market ori-
ented to one degree or another and democratically governed in
one form or another. Second, there is a degree of uniqueness in
by Leonard Bailey
elite', the Court remains susceptible and responsive to
other influences, including the personal ideologies of indi-
vidual members of the Court and the demands of the rel-
atively powerless. This article rejects an instrumental
the institutional forms and historical development of democratic
capitalism in the United States. For instance, as an institution
the Supreme Court possesses more power than do the judiciar-
ies in most other societies, perhaps because this society has
unique problems requiring a more powerful judiciary for their
resolution, or perhaps because other capitalist societies address
similar problems through other institutions.
2. See C.W. Mills, THE POWER ELITE (1959). By the term"power elite" I refer to that class or group of people who, by
virtue of wealth, ownership or control of the means of produc-
tion, access to knowledge and social position, wield predominant
political, economic and social power in the United States. I do
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view of the Supreme Court as an agent of a monolithic
capitalist class in the narrow sense of acting directly
under the control and strictly at the behest of that class.
It also rejects a formalist view of the Supreme Court as a
predominantly independent body having a life and logic
entirely of its own, and seeking either its own aggrandize-
ment or the advancement of some well-defined or neu-
trally-determined principles of liberal justice.' Rather I
will argue that the Supreme Court's relative autonomy
serves to legitimize and stabilize the system by enabling
the Court to mediate disputes which might otherwise
threaten its viability.4 From this vantage point the results
not mean to imply that the power elite is a monolithic, homoge-
neous, all-powerful class with a well-defined and agreed upon
agenda. There is much infighting and disagreement among the
power elite; some elites are more powerful than others; there is
a degree of mobility both into and out of elite status; and those
who are not elites also possess some power. I do mean to imply
that power in the United States is hierarchically and unevenly
distributed; that the more powerful are able to use their power
to dominate and exploit the less powerful; that this situation is
endemic to United States-style democratic capitalism; and that
the power elite have a common interest, which they act on in
ways both organized and spontaneous, in preserving the system
and their privileged status within it.
3. On the concepts of instrumentalism and formalism, see
Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the
Relative Autonomy of the Law, 11 L. & Soc. REV. 571, 572-73
(1977). For a recent defense of legal formalism, postulating
"that law is intelligible as an internally coherent phenomenon,"
see Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of
Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 951 (1988).
4. The concept of relative autonomy fits into either a struc-
tural/functional or post-structural critical approach to law. In
response to instrumentalism, which views law in terms of its
content and attempts to explain how given laws further the in-
terests of the capitalist power structure, structuralism/ func-
tionalism views law-making more as a process which in general
serves to maintain the system even when particular laws seem
counter to the interests of the capitalist power structure. Thus,
the relative autonomy of law is related to the need to resolve
conflicts in a social system in which the capitalist power.struc-
ture predominates but is neither totally unified nor all powerful.
What instrumentalism, structuralism and functionalism all have
in common, in the orthodox Marxist tradition, is a deterministic
or materialistic view of law as emanating from the economic
base of or the productive forces at play in society. See Burris,
Introduction: The Structuralist Influence in Marxist Theory
and Research, 9 THE INSURGENT SOCIOLOGIST at 4-17 (No. I
Summer 1979); Grau, Whatever Happened to Politics? A Cri-
tique of Structuralist Marxist Accounts of State and Law,
MARXISM AND LAW at 196-209 (1982). Critical thinking, on
the other hand, views all explanations as essentially indetermi-
nate, in that competing explanations are always possible and
are always subject to deconstruction by exposing their unstated
and unprovable assumptions about human nature or social real-
ity. This view, which in the extreme leads to a total denial of
any possible objectivity, everything being subjectively created in
the mind of the beholder, rejects any definitive explanation of
law. See Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory
and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 691-735
(1985); Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV.
127 (1984). More dialectically, my view is that both the struc-
tural/functional and critical approaches are aspects of a
broader materialist approach which views all aspects of exis-
tence - the environmental and biological, the social and cul-
tural, the economic and political and ideological, the objective
and the subjective - as determining and contributing to an un-
derstanding of life and law. See Holt, Recovery by the Worker
of particular cases are largely irrelevant in terms of their
doctrinal correctness; what counts is whether the process
as a whole helps to contain the system's internal stresses
and strains and thereby to maintain the dominance of the
power elite.'
The Role of the Supreme Court
THE TENSION IN LIBERAL SOCIETY
Liberalism's vision of United States-style democratic
capitalism is one of self-determination. This entails a
public sphere in which people have the right to partici-
pate on equal terms in collective decision-making, for the
most part by elected representatives who are accountable
and therefore responsive to the people through the politi-
cal process. It also entails a private sphere in which indi-
viduals have the right to reserve for themselves decisions
which are claimed to be exclusively or dominantly per-
sonal and which are thus of no legitimate collective con-
cern (e.g., free exercise of religion). The notion of the
private sphere also implies the right to prevent the public
from mistreating or imposing on individuals in certain
ways (e.g., cruel and unusual punishment).6 Accordingly,
Who Quits: A Comparison of the Mainstream, Legal Realist
and Critical Legal Studies Approaches to a Problem of Nine-
teenth Century Contract Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 677, 706-25.
This is a view of the law-making process as "both constituted
by and constituting the world" in which it exists, Peller, The
Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1269
(1985); and as part of an "indeterminate historical process...
which remains subject to determinate pressures." E.P. Thomp-
son, THE POVERTY OF THEORY AND OTHER ESSAYS at 84
(1978). From this critical vantage point relative autonomy helps
account for the fact that law-making, and in particular Su-
preme Court decision-making, seems sometimes supportive of
the system and sometimes not, sometimes responsive to eco-
nomic and productive forces and sometimes not, sometimes ex-
plicable and sometimes not. I would assert, though, that eco-
nomic factors have historically been predominant, especially in
the capitalist era.
5. For other treatments of the relative autonomy of law in
capitalist societies, all of which have greatly influenced this es-
say, see Balbus, 11 L. & Soc. REV. 571 (cited in note 3); H.
Collins, MARXISM AND LAW (1982); Klare, Law-Making as
Praxis, 40 TELOS 123 (1979); E.P. Thompson, WHIGS AND
HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT at 258-269 (1975);
Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order:
Balbus and the Challenge of Critical Social Thought About
Law, II L. & Soc. REV. 529 (1977); Tushnet, A Marxist Anal-
ysis of American Law, I MARXIST PERSPECTIVES 96 (1978).
The debate among the adherents of relative autonomy is
whether law is a total illusion - an intellectual sleight of hand
which perpetuates the dominance of the capitalist ruling class
by creating a false conscious belief in a mythical ideology of
justice which masks the reality of inequality and exploitation -
or whether law can, to a limited extent at least, ameliorate
some of the injustices of capitalist society. Balbus seems in-
clined to the former view; Collins, Klare, Thompson and
Trubek to the latter; while Tushnet seems skeptical. My view of
law generally is close to Klare's assessment of the National La-
bor Relations Act as "a prospect or aspiration for democratic
and, to some degree, anti-capitalist social change, as well as a
buttress to the institutional system for state administration and
containment of the class struggle." Klare, 40 TELOS at 131.
6. On the public/private distinction, see Symposium on the
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
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liberal society has a built-in tension between the collec-
tive and the personal - the public and the private - a
tension whose resolution requires carving out a domain
within which the individual is largely sovereign.7 In addi-
tion, the premise of self-determination that all human be-
ings are worthy, as in "all men are created equal," gives
rise to the claim that individuals not only have the nega-
tive right to a sovereign domain and freedom from domi-
nation, but also the positive right at times to have the
society provide certain goods, services or conditions.
These might include equality of opportunity or a mini-
mum standard of living, without which their humanity
would be denied. This claim also gives rise to a built-in
tension in liberal society between that aspect of the ideol-
ogy which emphasizes individual worth and that which
emphasizes individual responsibility for success or failure
in life.'
This paper focuses on the Supreme Court's role in
resolving conflicts and thereby helping to mediate these
tensions in liberal society.9 One approach to the tensions
would be to leave their resolution entirely to the political
process. This has not been the approach in the United
7. Compare, Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:
The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1096-1109 (1981); F. Hayek,
LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A
FREE PEOPLE at 128-52 (1973) and THE CONSTITUTION OF LIB-
ERTY at 103-17, 205-19 (1960); Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 351-82
(1979). Self-determination also includes the right, when operat-
ing within one's sovereign domain, to be free from domination
and exploitation by others acting within their sovereign do-
mains. Thus democratic capitalism's individualistic ideology,
coupled with its privatization of economic (and other) relation-
ships, produces conflicts among individuals requiring resolution
through the articulation and enforcement of standards of indi-
vidual behavior toward one another.
8. Compare, B. Ackerman, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE (1980); Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Re-
spect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA.
L. REV. 933 (1983); J. Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
For a critique of the mythology of equality of opportunity, see
Freeman, Racism, Rights, and the Quest for Equality of Oppor-
tunity, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 295, 362-85 (1988).
9. An examination of Supreme Court decisions readily dis-
closes the Court's greater willingness to address individual
claims of the negative type, i.e., to be left alone by the govern-
ment, than of the positive type, i.e., to be provided goods by the
government. The government must provide indigent criminal
defendants with certain services for free, and must accord cer-
tain procedural safeguards to the recipients of government lar-
gesse; but for the most part the Court has left welfare state
issues to the political process. See notes 96-101 and accompany-
ing text. The reason for this is not the absence of applicable
constitutional provisions; for instance the Court could easily in-
terpret the equal protection clause to require the government to
ensure everyone a judicially determined minimum standard of
living. See note 98. Rather, I suggest, the Court has chosen not
to deal with such claims for a set of reasons including the fol-
lowing: to do so might undermine the capitalist system; the.con-
straining impact of the political process on the Court would
make it difficult to implement such rulings, since it is far easier
to strike down or to refuse to enforce the actions of another unit
of government than to order it to take affirmative action, partic-
ularly action which would entail massive redistribution of
wealth (see note 99); and, finally, such issues have been medi-
ated passably well through the political process.
States where dispute resolution has been a joint venture
of the political process and the judiciary. The political
process mediates disputes through compromise and con-
sensus, and legitimizes the resulting bargains through the
ideology of democracy.10 This method of dispute resolu-
tion often works well but also has its weaknesses, particu-
larly regarding issues, about which people have passionate
feelings. Those on the losing side tend to examine the
fairness of the political process more closely and thus to
recognize that the system is stacked against them, that
some have far more influence than others, and that the
resulting compromises smack more of overreaching than
of equal bargaining.
Such recognitions threaten the legitimacy of the sys-
tem. Even if the fairness of the process is not questioned,
strong feelings may impel the losers to seek reconsidera-
tion of issues, an option always available in the political
process. Frequent reconsideration of passionate issues is
destabilizing, however, in part because it is time consum-
ing and thus interferes with the capacity of the process to
The political process mediates disputes
through compromise and consensus, and
legitimizes the resulting bargains
through the ideology of democracy.
deal with other matters. More importantly, publicly re-
hashing passionate disagreements may produce implaca-
ble enemies and generally undermine the willingness to
compromise on which the process depends. And most of
all, while liberal ideology advocates it in theory, free and
open public debate is problematical in a capitalist society
because it risks exposing the society's contradictions, such
as the myth that truly free and open debate is possible in
an inegalitarian society. Hence, liberal societies require
ways to constrain debate while simultaneously champion-
ing the democratic myth.
In moments like these the Supreme Court fulfills a
crucial function: to help stabilize the system by offering
an alternative forum for the resolution of disputes which,
due to their passionate or contradictory nature, threaten
to undermine United States-style democratic capital-
ism." In mediating disputes and legitimizing the system,
10. The recent republican revival posits an alternative way
of looking at the political process: rather than a bargaining/
mediation process among diverse groups in pursuit of competing
self-interests, republicanism touts civic virtue and the public
good. See, for example, Symposium: The Civic Republican Tra-
dition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). In light of the predominance
in the political process of an economic and political power elite
which tises its power to its own advantage, this is more an aspi-
ration than a reality, as its proponents recognize. This aspira-
tion for civic virtue and the common good is quite compatible
with the Marxist perspective taken here; but it is realizable, I
would argue, only in a radically egalitarian society.
11. This does not mean that every case or even most cases
coming before the Court involve monumental disputes which in
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the Court relies not on bargaining and the ideology of
democracy as the political process does, but instead on
the ideology of neutrality and of the rule of law. 2 By
appearing to be disinterested, and by appearing to decide
cases pursuant to objectively determined higher-order
principles of justice emanating from the Constitution, the
Court often succeeds in gaining public respect for itself
as an institution and for its decisions.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SUPREME COURT
In attempting to account for the Supreme Court's
mediating/legitimizing role, afi analytical starting point
is to recognize that the Court has been designed as a rel-
atively independent institution. This independence derives
principally from the fact that appointments to the bench
are for life, subject to removal only by impeachment for
cause;1 3 that the Court has the power to overturn the ac-
their own right seriously threaten the system, although many
do. A series of seemingly mundane cases in a given area, how-
ever, might well involve a common dispute which if unresolved
might pose a threat. The issue of separation of church and
state, to pick an area not covered herein, seems a good example.
The thesis is that by shifting the arena of debate on this issue,
at least somewhat from the political process to the judiciary,
the Court may have helped deter a potentially more divisive
public debate.
12. Compare, for example, Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1-20 (1971);
R. Unger, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY at 52-54, 66-70, 176-78
(1977); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). For critiques of the concepts
of neutral principles and of the rule of law, see Kleven, The
Constitutional Philosophy of Justice William H. Rehnquist, 8
VT. L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1983) (ideology inevitably impacts the der-
ivation and application of purportedly neutral principles); R.
Unger, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY at 178-80 (judges must es-
tablish priorities among competing sets of beliefs); Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 804-24 (1983)
(neutral principles are inconsistent with liberalism's premise of
autonomous individuals having independent choices and values,
all principles consequently being value-laden and therefore non-
neutral).
13. The only attempted removal by impeachment of a Su-
preme Court justice was that of Samuel Chase in 1805. Chase
was acquitted by the Senate in what has been characterized as
an obviously incorrect and partisan judgment. R. Berger, IM-
PEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS at 224-51
(1973). In more recent times impeachment movements were un-
successfully broached against Earl Warren and William 0.
Douglas, and Abe Fortas resigned in the face of charges of im-
propriety in office. On the uncertainty of the "good behavior"
standard and whether Congress could provide for the removal
of federal judges by means other than impeachment, see R.
Berger, IMPEACHMENT; Kurland, The Constitution and the Ten-
ure of Federal Judges, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1969); Stolz,
Disciplining Federal Judges: Is Impeachment Hopeless? 57
CAL. L. REV. 659 (1969). Today, impeachment would probably
require rather convincing evidence that a justice has acted law-
lessly or immorally in an official capacity. Certainly more would
be required than mere disgruntlement with a justice's decisions,
although once such evidence was offered, ideological considera-
tions might well be the telling factor sub rosa in a decision to
impeach or not to impeach. Yet, while the requisites of im-
peachment may protect the Court's independence, the possibil-
,ity of impeachment, though historically remote, may still have a
constraining impact on Supreme Court decision-making. Like-
wise the fact that the impeachment of a Supreme Court justice
has rarely even been broached may be both a testament to the
tions of other units of government as violative of the Con-
stitution;14 and that the political process can directly
override Court decisions only by amending the Constitu-
tion, a cumbersome process which has rarely been used to
counter the Court.'
5
At the same time there are structural constraints un-
dercutting the Supreme Court's independence. First, the
appointment process allows both the President and the
Senate to consider ideology in selecting and confirming
Supreme Court justices. To the extent it is possible to
predict future judicial behavior, the appointment process
is a means of controlling Supreme Court decision-mak-
ing. Thus nominees to the Court, typically but not neces-
sarily members of or sympathetic to the dominant class,
must demonstrate by their training, experience and ca-
reers that they are mainstream thinkers. Should an occa-
sional maverick slip through, the fact that there are nine
justices would minimize that person's influence anyway.
Consequently, radical thinking is rarely found on the Su-
preme Court and revolutionary thinking, in the sense of
undercutting the foundations of United States-style dem-
ocratic capitalism, is unknown.
Second, lacking such tools as the power to tax or
force of arms, the Supreme Court must rely on the coop-
eration of other public officials and of the public itself to
effectuate its decisions. While the mythology of Supreme
Court impartiality and of the rule of law may deter out-
right refusals to obey judicial orders, there are many
Court's independence, as well as a sign of its perspicacity in
exercising that independence.
14. Deriving, of course, from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (federal action) and Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (state action). The issue
of whether the power to override was usurped by the Court or
intended by the Constitution's framers has been well ventilated.
See, for example, R. Berger, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
351-62, 373-96 (1977); A. Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH at 1-34 (1962). This is a moot point, though, as re-
gards the Court's role as mediator. It is unnecessary to contend
that either the framers or the Court envisioned the Court's act-
ing as a mediator in the sense argued in this paper, although
they may well have and obviously saw the Court as a dispute
resolver of some type. It is enough for my purposes to show that
the Court has come to and does function as a system-sustaining
mediator whether the players are fully aware of it or not. In-
deed, the Marxist notion of false consciousness posits that by
virtue of cultural conditioning a system's insiders frequently if
not usually view matters from the perspective of the system's
supportive ideologies rather than as they really are or are
viewed by those with differing perspectives. See Kennedy, 28
BUFF. L. REV. 205 (cited in notes 7 & 19); G. Lukacs, HISTORY
AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS at 46-82 (1971).
15. Although this paper's focus is on the Supreme Court's
mediating role in constitutional cases, it plays a similar and as
significant a role in cases of statutory interpretation. See, for
example, the articles cited note 33. In statutory interpretation
cases the political process can more readily and frequently does
directly override Court decisions by amending the statute. As
discussed in the next two paragraphs of the text, however, there
is also a give-and-take between the political process and the ju-
diciary as to constitutional cases. Thus in both types of cases
the mediating roles of the Court and the political process inter-
relate, sometimes in competing and sometimes in complemen-
tary ways depending on the context.
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ways to thwart Supreme Court decisions without violat-
ing the law. If the Court outlaws enforced racial segrega-
tion in public schools, then school officials may devise os-
tensibly color-blind methods which achieve the same
result. Or whites not wanting their children in integrated
settings may use their superior economic power to segre-
gate themselves in locales or their children in private
schools beyond the means of most minorities. Other ways
to thwart Court decisions include the ability of those in
power to use their greater access to the media to turn
public opinion against the Court, the myth of impartiality
demanding that the Court confine its lobbying mostly to
its opinions. Also, those who control the appointment pro-
cess can wait for justices with whom they disagree to die
or retire in order to aDooint retlacements committed to
reversing earlier rulings. Finally, the mythology of impar-
tiality and the rule of law serves not only to legitimize
the Court and secure compliance but also to constrain it;
since the Court relies so heavily for its power on the my-
thology, it must behave or appear to behave in an impar-
tial manner lest it lose the very respect on which it
depends.
RELATIVE AUTONOMY: THE LIBERAL VIEW
The liberal view of the role of the Supreme Court in
individual rights cases regards the Court as a protector of
fundamental personal rights against the tyranny of the
majority. 6 Since individual rights are by definition sup-
posed to override collective concerns, or at least to have a
higher priority in public debate, it is logical under the
liberal view to assign responsibility for their protection to
a body which is to some degree removed from the politi-
cal process. 7
16. This paper will focus largely on individual rights cases;
although as allusions to separation of powers and federalism
cases will show, a similar analysis should also apply to them.
See cases cited in notes 35-41 and accompanying text, and note
89.
17. This general view is accepted by both ends of the liberal
political spectrum. The debate is over how wide ranging the Su-
preme Court should be in protecting individual rights. The so-
called interpretivist view is that the Court should construe the
Constitution in accordance with the intent of the framers.
Where the language of the Constitution is broad and general,
interpretivists would confine its reach to the types of concerns
which seem to have prompted the adoption of the provision in
question. The asserted rationale for the interpretivist position is
that lawmaking is acceptable in this society only if democratic,
that the Supreme Court's structural insulation makes it an in-
herently undemocratic body, and that the Court is justified in
overriding the political and thus more democratic branches of
government only when protecting those higher and enduring
values democratically constitutionalized by earlier generations.
Sophisticated interpretivists acknowledge, of course, the diffi-
culty of precisely determining the meaning of broad constitu-
tional provisions; thus they counsel a narrow construction of
such provisions in order to avoid what they view as
nondemocratic policy making by the Supreme Court. On inter-
pretivism, see R. Berger, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (cited in
note 14); Bork, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (cited in note 12); Rehnquist,
The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693
(1976). For critiques arguing that the framers' intent is impos-
sible to discern, see J. Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST at 1-41
(1980); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Under-
standing, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Tushnet, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 781 (cited in note 12).
Liberal theory also accounts for the theoretical and
practical constraints against total Supreme Court inde-
pendence. Under any liberal theory, the Court should not
impose its collective view of what is best for society, but
should base its decisions on the framers' intent, natural
rights or evolving moral principles. But since the corre-
sponding specifics are usually debatable, too much inde-
pendence might allow the Court to impose its views while
rationalizing its decisions in terms of the intent of the
framers, natural rights or evolving moral principles.
Therefore, there is a need to confine the Court within ac-
ceptable limits in the only way seemingly possible: by
making the Court somewhat responsive to the contempo-
rary political process while at the same time preserving
enough Court independence from that process to enable
it to perform the function of judicial review.
Notably absent from contemporary liberal views of
the Court is an explicitly articulated pro-capitalist posi-
tion or even a position regarding the proper functioning
of the economic system. Liberal views share the premise
The so-called non-interpretivist view allows for a more ex-
pansive reading by the Supreme Court of the broad individual
rights provisions of the Constitution. Here there are several
competing schools of thought, all of which basically agree, how-
ever, that broad language invites expansive interpretation. The
process-oriented school believes the Court should intervene,
through the use of such provisions as the due process and equal
protection clauses, when the democratic process breaks down -
in particular when those adversely affected by democratic deci-
sion-making lack access to the process or are consistently sin-
gled out for unfavorable treatment. Compare, J. Ely, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST; Sandalow, Judicial Protection of
Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977). For critiques, see
Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981)
(substantive rights cannot be separated from process since fair
process assumes or necessitates substantive rights); Parker, The
Past of Constitutional Theory - and its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
223 (1981) (process approach assumes, without empirical sup-
port and probably falsely so, that the political process is basi-
cally sound). As to substantive rights this school agrees with
interpretivists that the Court should protect only those rights
specifically articulated in the Constitution or fairly inferrable
from articulated rights. The disagreement evidently is over how
well the democratic process functions, or how possible it is to
develop or apply criteria for identifying breakdowns in the dem-
ocratic process. Other non-interpretivists, on the other hand, be-
lieve the Supreme Court justified in articulating substantive in-
dividual rights beyond those specified in the Constitution or
contemplated by the framers. Their rationale is that it is possi-
ble in addition to identify inherent natural rights or evolving
principles of justice implicit in culture in the United States, and
that with its relative independence the Court is well suited to
discover them or at least to aid in their discovery. Compare, for
example, Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed
Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029
(1980); R. Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); Grey,
Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1975); M. Perry, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW at 886-990 (1978); Wellington, Common Law Rules and
Constitutional Double Standards, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973). For
a critique, see Brest, The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981) (arguing
that no defensible criteria exist for determining substantive
rights).
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that economic issues fall within the purview of demo-
cratic decisions-making, subject only to such constitu-
tional limitations as the prohibitions against deprivation
of property without due process of law and against un-
compensated takings; the political process and not the ju-
diciary should regulate commerce and industry and de-
termine which goods and services to furnish publicly. The
Supreme Court, as an adjudicator of constitutional is-
sues, should be concerned rather with the proper func-
tioning of the political system as it relates to non-eco-
nomic individual rights claims. The explanation for this, I
suggest, is twofold. Most importantly, the political pre-
dominance of the capitalist power elite obviates the need
for direct judicial protection of its economic interests.
Moreover, through judicial forays into the economic
sphere, the Court would risk either undercutting its legit-
imacy by taking too obvious a pro-capitalist stance or un-
dermining the power elite by impinging too much on the
economic system.18
RELATIVE AUTONOMY: A MARXIST PERSPECTIVE
The Marxist critique of the liberal view of the Su-
preme Court challenges its basic premises. The first lib-
eral premise, the ideology of democracy, regards the po-
litical process, albeit falling short of the ideal of being
perfectly just or responsive to the will of the people, as
working passably well, as serving the interests of most of
the people most of the time, and as containing within it-
self the means of rectifying injustice. The Marxist per-
spective, on the other hand, maintains that the purpose of
liberal democracy is to help sustain the capitalist system
and the dominance of its power structure. 9 The second
18. See note 9 and notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
19. See generally, L. Althusser, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY at
127-86 (1971); A. Gramsci, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON
NOTEBOOKS (1971); N. Poulantzas, STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM
(1978). In pursuing this end, the liberal state has several inter-
related subfunctions: establishing capitalist institutions and pro-
moting the development of capitalism; legitimizing the use of
force to repress challenges to the system; producing a wide de-
gree of consent to the system among the dominated classes by
advancing through its various institutions a supportive ideology
of democracy and individualism which masks the reality of ex-
ploitation; and providing an arena for resolving disputes within
the dominant class and between the dominant and subordinate
classes. On the mediating and legitimizing function of law in
liberal society, see Kennedy, 28 BUFF. L. REV. at 210 (cited in
note 7)(law as "an instrument of apology- an attempt to mys-
tify both dominators and dominated by convincing them of the
'naturalness,' the 'freedom' and the 'rationality' of a condition
of bondage"). Hyde criticizes the notion that law, particularly
court-made law, creates legitimacy, which is defined as the "be-
lief that an order is obligatory or exemplary" accompanied by
conforming action. Hyde argues that this notion is not sup-
ported and is even contradicted by such empirical evidence as
low public awareness of legal institutions, low opinion of courts,
and substantial behavioral nonconformity with judicial deci-
sions. To the extent that people do conform with law, he sug-
gests as possible alternative explanations habit and rational cal-
culation - for example, avoidance of punishment. Hyde, The
Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L.
REV. 379. To be sure, there is an empirical side to the legiti-
macy notion. I suggest, however, two caveats to Hyde's analy-
sis. First, it is not my contention that the Supreme Court oper-
ates perfectly as a legitimizing institution, but that it and many
liberal premise is the ideology of the rule of law, which
views the Supreme Court as assisting society to rectify
injustice through the enforcement of impartially and ob-
jectively determined higher-order principles of law. The
Marxist perspective advanced here denies the attainabil-
ity of impartiality and objectivity in the law and views
the Supreme Court's role as helping to legitimize and sta-
bilize the system by mediating disputes arising out of the
internal contradictions of United States-style democratic
capitalism. According to the Marxist perspective, it is the
Supreme Court's relative autonomy which enables it to
play this role effectively.
2 0
At first blush, the notion of even a partially indepen-
dent judiciary might seem incongruous in a capitalist so-
ciety, particularly to those with a crude instrumental per-
spective of the state as a tool of capitalist domination. In
such a society one would expect to find the judiciary op-
Notably absent from contemporary lib-
eral views of the Court is an explicitly
articulated pro-capitalist position or
even a position regarding the proper
functioning of the economic system.
erating hand in glove with the ruling class. Instrumental
relations of this type have existed at times not only in
capitalist but also in other societies where power has been
heavily concentrated in the hands of a few. In such socie-
ties law serves not its usual legitimating function, since
raw force need not be legitimized where power is abso-
lute, but rather as a mechanism of control, a means of
instilling fear, a signal that certain behavior will not be
tolerated and that certain consequences will follow. In
other institutions serve that purpose in overlapping and subtle
ways which are difficult to test empirically. I hope that the
analysis in the next section will support, although I do not claim
that it is empirically refined enough to conclusively prove, the
thesis that the Supreme Court often plays a successful legiti-
mizing role. For example, thirty-five years after the Brown case,
most people in the South view enforced segregation as unjust;
and it seems inescapable that the Supreme Court, along with
national public disapproval and federal legislation, played some
role in causing an attitudinal change and thus in legitimizing
the abolition of official apartheid. Second, that there are many
people who question the legitimacy of Supreme Court decisions
or of the system should not surprise us, both because this sys-
tem is fraught with injustice and contradiction and because the
Court always operates within the broad range of mainstream
thinking. My assertion is that by mediating the resulting con-
flicts and ameliorating injustices to some degree, the Supreme
Court enhances the system's legitimacy to a greater degree than
would be the case if the Court or some substitute institution did
not exist. Since the impact of a counterfactual social state-of-
affairs cannot be empirically tested, it is not possible to fully
validate this assertion. That does not necessarily make the as-
sertion fallacious, however; it does mean that its validity de-
pends less on rigorous testing than on historical interpretation
and contextual analysis, and must therefore always remain
somewhat uncertain.
20. Compare works cited in note 5 and note 33.
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such societies there is little need for even the pretense of
fair procedures or judicial impartiality, as, for example,
in the case of political trials in Nazi Germany.
Power, however, is rarely absolute and in most socie-
ties its exercise must be somehow legitimized. While the
theology of the divine right of kings operated as a legiti-
mizing device in medieval Europe, in the contemporary
United States the democratic political process serves that
purpose. 21 The ideology of democracy is one of self-gov-
ernance; of government of, by, and for the people. Thus
law is legitimized as "self-made" and as enjoying the
consent of the governed. Even when one is on the losing
end of a political issue, the ideology of self-governance
holds true in that everyone has an equal right to partici-
pate, that elected officials have the duty to represent all
their constituents and not just those who voted for them,
and that sometimes you win and sometimes you lose but
in the long run everyone's interests are served.
Some analysts view democracy in capitalist societies
as a sham which disguises the total domination of society
by a monolithic capitalist class.2 2 This seems doubtful.
Capitalists frequently disagree vehemently among them-
selves. Moreover, there is power in numbers, and the very
purpose of liberal democracy is to accommodate demands
for power-sharing more than do autocratic regimes.
While the vote in this country was initially limited
largely to propertied white males, thus giving rise to a
symbiotic relationship between late eighteenth century
democracy and the competitive capitalism of that era, it
is significant that the franchise has become essentially
universal since then. In part this phenomenon should also
21. See, for example, R. Dahl, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC
THEORY (1956); M. Edelman, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLIT-
ICS (1964); A. de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA at 51-
53, 159, 181-226 (1966).
22. Compare, for example, B. Avakian, DEMOCRACY: CAN'T
WE Do BETTER THAN THAT? (1986). Despite allusions in his
works supportive of such an instrumental view of the state in
capitalist society, it is doubtful that Marx himself adhered
strictly to this view. Marx did refer to the state as "an engine of
class despotism," K. Marx, THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE, cx-
cerpted in L. Feuer, ed., MARX AND ENGELS, BASIC WRITINGS
ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 363 (1959), and as "ruled by
capitalist and landlord," K. Marx, CAPITAL: A CRITICAL ANAL-
YSIS OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION at 239 (1967 trans. ed.); and
he did detail the use of state power to establish the capitalist
mode of production. Marx, CAPITAL at 270-72, 717-41, 750-60.
Yet Marx also detailed the at least partially successful struggle
of the working class and its allies to secure legislation establish-
ing a "normal working day" over the objection of industrial
capitalists, Id. at 278-302, 470-503; while at the same time not-
ing, in accord with a thesis of this essay, that the enactment of
the Factory Acts was facilitated by the fact that they actually
served the interests of capital by deterring the premature spoli-
ation of labor power through overwork, Id. at 239, 266, 269-
270. Their enactment also contributed to the concentration of
capital in fewer hands by forcing out of business smaller entre-
preneurs unable to comply. Id. at 474-75, 482. Likewise Engels,
while characterizing the "modern representative state [as] an
instrument of exploitation of wage labor by capital," also noted
"periods ... in which the warring classes balance each other so
nearly that the state power, as ostensible mediator, acquires, for
the moment, a certain degree of independence of both." F. En-
gels, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
STATE at 160 (1972).
be seen as serving the interests of capital, and particu-
larly of monopoly capital.28 If the franchise had remained
limited to the propertied, the growth of monopoly capital,
which depends on the active promotion of its development
by the state, might have been inhibited by the domina-
tion of the political process by smaller entrepreneurs
more disposed to a laissez-faire economic system. Though
great in wealth and economic power, monopoly capitalists
are few in number compared with smaller entrepeneurs.
Thus extending the franchise to the workers and other
dependents of monopoly capitalists favors the latter polit-
ically to the extent that their workers and dependents
perceive a community of interest with them or can be in-
fluenced by them. It is no accident that the domination
of the economy by big business and the increased democ-
ratization of the political process have gone hand in
hand.
The democratization of the United States derives in
part from people's demands to participate in controlling
their destinies - a demand emanating perhaps from an
innate desire to be free or perhaps fueled by the en-
hanced possibilities for material well-being and the in-
creased knowledge which have accompanied the develop-
ment of capitalism. The interests of such people are not
likely to coincide entirely with those of the capitalist
class. Moreover, the interests of monopoly capitalists and
their workers/dependents, while they may not be entirely
antagonistic, particularly in prosperous times, do not en-
tirely conincide either, particularly in hard times. So
whatever the explanation, once the political process ex-
pands it represents, at least in theory, a potential source
of power to the masses in their struggle against domina-
tion and inequality. And the masses have arguably
achieved some successes through the political process,
such as the right to unionize, anti-discrimination laws,
and the various components of the modern welfare state.
While apparent victories are often illusory or less sig-
nificant than they may appear, it seems unlikely that a
totally empty political process could deceive a sufficient
proportion of the people for a sufficient proportion of the
time to sustain its legitimacy. Too many measures op-
posed by capitalists have been generated by the political
process to dismiss the process as a total sham. Hence, the
modern Marxist view of the relative autonomy of the
23. By monopoly capital(ism) I mean an economy domi-
nated by large-scale enterprises which have sufficient market
power to operate monopolistically or oligopolistically and whose
economic dominance and continued growth are both self-cre-
ated and supported by government. The government, in turn, is
dominated though not completely controlled by monopoly capi-
tal's beneficiaries/ dependents and particularly its power elite.
This view of the way advanced capitalism works is supported by
scholars from a variety of schools of thought. Their differences
relate to such issues as the level of well-being monopoly capital-
ism provides, the deep-seatedness of class conflicts, and the pos-
sibility of internal reform. See P. Baran & P. Sweezy, MONOP-
OLY CAPITAL: AN ESSAY ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL ORDER (1966); J.K. Galbraith, ECONOMICS AND THE
PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973); G. Kolko, MAIN CURRENTS IN MOD-
ERN AMERICAN HISTORY (1976); C. Lindblom, POLITICS AND
MARKETS at 144-233 (1977).
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state portrays a state in which the power of capital pre-
dominates but does not completely control, a state which
largely serves the interests of capital, particularly monop-
oly capital, but which also mediates the internecine dis-
putes and class (and quasi-class)2 struggles arising under
capitalism. 5
This excursion into the democratic political process
has been necessary in order to put the Supreme Court in
context. The question, simply put, is why a relatively au-
tonomous judiciary in a relatively autonomous state? One
arguable purpose for an independent judiciary, not appli-
cable to the United States Supreme Court, would view
the judiciary as an agent of the power elite designed to
prevent a relatively autonomous political process from in-
fringing overly on its prerogatives - a House of Lords
with teeth. Both the Supreme Court's structural ties to
the relatively autonomous political process, as well as its
actual decisions, belie such an instrumental view. I would
argue, instead, that an independent Supreme Court but-
tresses the mediating and legitimating function of the po-
litical process by providing an alternative forum for the
resolution of disputes which might otherwise disrupt the
political process and threaten the system's stability.
In this regard, the Court's relative independence from
the political process serves it well by adding credence to
the aura of impartiality and objectivity. A Court too
closely tied to and too much like the political process
would merely replicate its weaknesses as a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism. These weaknesses, as noted, are the ac-
tual imbalance of the political process which more highly
charged issues may expose, and the lack of finality of po-
litical decisions. The Supreme Court's relative indepen-
dence from the political process helps it avoid charges of
imbalance. And its reliance on higher-order principles of
justice, which by definition are supposed to be more du-
rable than the more short-term policy considerations
characterizing many political decisions, together with its
ability to avoid reconsideration of issues by invoking stare
decisis or exercising its discretion to refuse to hear cases,
adds a finality to Supreme Court decisions missing from
the political process.
24. By "quasi-class" struggles I refer to struggles against
domination and oppression which do not directly involve, al-
though they may be related to, capitalist relations of produc-
tion. Racial and sexual oppression, for example, two issues
which have frequently come before the Supreme Court, are not
peculiar to capitalist societies and may arise at least in part
from non-economic factors such as xenophobia and religion.
Both, however, also have economic underpinnings in that they
involve the exploitation of others' labor in one way or another
(see text at notes 58-68, 84-85, 90-103, and 118-23); and both
are ultimately materialist in origin in that they arise out of his-
torical circumstance.
25. See L. Althusser, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY at 127-86,
A. Gramsci, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS, N.
Poulantzas, STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM (cited in note 19). The
debate among theorists focuses on the extent to which the rela-
tive autonomy of the state permits the dominated classes to
achieve real victories in the class struggle or only creates the
illusion of victory on an ideological level. Poulantzas adheres
within limits to the former view, while Althusser and Gramsci
seem to lean more toward the latter. My view is closer to
Poulantzas'.
When carefully scrutinized, however, the Supreme
Court's aura of impartiality and objectivity proves more
apparent than real or, better perhaps, only partly real.
Critical legal scholars, like the legal realists of an earlier
era, have been quite successful in exposing the Court's
contradictions. First, as discussed above the Court's ties
to the political process ensure that only mainstream
thinkers will sit on the bench. While I have no doubt that
many, perhaps most, Supreme Court justices think of
themselves as impartial, and to a degree act as such, their
impartiality operates within the limits of mainstream
thinking. Moreover, many justices receive their appoint-
ments because they have already staked out a particular
constitutional philosophy, which is to say a bias, accept-
able to those in power.
In addition, there is no such thing as an objectively
correct interpretation of the Constitution. Rather, the
provisions of the Constitution are sufficiently open-ended,
and the proper approach to interpreting it sufficiently de-
batable, as to lend support to a variety of readings and
results. This means, however well reasoned Supreme
Court opinions may appear, that all constitutional issues
are essentially indeterminate and that their resolution
therefore reflects the subjectivity and ideology of the de-
cision-makers.2 6 This is not to say that justices decide
cases by asking themselves how they would vote on issues
in the same way that legislators do or what results would
best serve their own selfish interests. It is to say, rather,
that the ideology of the rule of law is based on a false
premise of objectivity, and that justices' decisions inevita-
bly and unavoidably represent not logically or rationally
deduced correct answers but their culturally and politi-
cally conditioned opinions as to what the law should be.2"
Consequently, too much public scrutiny of the Su-
26. See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The
Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholar-
ship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Symposium, A Critique of
Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363 (1984); Tushnet, Critical Legal
Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction,
36 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984); Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Lib-
eral Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411 (1981); R. Unger,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS at 88-100 (1975); Yablon, The In-
determinacy of Law: Critical Legal Studies and the Problem of
Legal Explanation, 6 CARDOZo L. REV. 917 (1985). To say
that Supreme Court decisions are indeterminate is not to say
that they are unpredictable, since knowledge of justices' ideo-
logical leanings may well enable one to predict outcomes. Inde-
terminacy refers instead to the inability to justify decisions as
based on anything other than debatable ideology.
27. The modern critical view is that the meaning of any
text is indeterminate. This means that a text is always open to
competing interpretations and that there is no objective test for
determining which is the correct interpretation. Consequently
interpretation is an essentially subjective process on the part of
the observer. Thus the Constitution is always amenable to a va-
riety of incompatible interpretations, whose resolution is ulti-
mately politically and ideologically based. Furthermore, any in-
tersubjective meaningfulness (if such is possible at all) depends
on consensus and shared understandings rather than on any-
thing inherent in the text. Shared understandings could relate
either to substantive meaning or to a decision-making process;
for example, the understanding could be to defer to the inter-
pretation of a third party such as the Supreme Court. But to be
legitimate or just, a shared understanding must flow from an
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preme Court risks undercutting its aura of impartiality
and objectivity, thereby subverting its role as a mediator/
legitimator. This insight suggests the importance of the
Supreme Court's operating in such a manner as to deflect
close public scrutiny. In the first place, this implies that
the Court must decide some cases against the government
and in favor of the relatively powerless. If all its decisions
rubber-stamped government action, or if it only inter-
vened on behalf of the rich and powerful, the Court
would soon lose all credibility. The Court's relative inde-
pendence is thus necessary to enable it to withstand polit-
ical pressure and overrule other units of government,
thereby demonstrating that it does not act simply at the
behest of other power elites.2 8
When it is exercised, particularly to the benefit of the
relatively powerless and the disadvantaged, the authority
to overrule has a coopting and pacifying effect. 9 Not
only does it at least partially redress their grievances, and
thereby undercut their willingness to resort to more dis-
ruptive and personally riskier tactics, it also helps con-
vince other aggrieved parties that redress is available
within the system and helps justify the use of force
against those who elect more disruptive options. Even
when the authority to overrule is not exercised, it coopts
and sustains. What matters is that it could have been ex-
ercised, and that it appears that the Court has indepen-
dently and impartially determined that the actions of
other units of government are fair and in accord with the
rule of law. This determination puts a stamp of approval
on those actions which transcends the partisanship of the
intersubjective process free of hierarchy and domination, or in
Habermas' words from "an ideal situation of discourse," lest
the understanding perpetuate the underlying hierarchy from
whence it arises. To me this implies that a society structured
along egalitarian socialist lines is a prerequisite to enlightened
discourse. On these points, see Balkin, Deconstructive Practice
and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987); J. Habermas,
THEORY AND PRACTICE at 1-40 (1973); Singer, The Player and
the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984);
Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic? 100 HARV. L. REV. 332
(1986); R. Unger, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY at 100-03, 236-89
(1976); Yablon, Book Review: Law and Metaphysics, 96 YALE
L.J. 613 (1987),
28. But compare Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. &
Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974) (on the general structural bias of the
litigation process in favor of the privileged) and Heydebrand &
Seron, The Double Bind of the Capitalist Judicial System, 9
INT'L J. OF THE SOC. OF L. 407, 408 (1982) (advanced capital-
ism's fiscal crisis produces "structural contradictions between
the promise of due process and the diminishing organizational
capacity of the judicial branch to make good on this promise").
29. Compare Abel's and Santos' evaluation of recent inno-
vations in informal and community justice. Abel, Conservative
Conflict and the Reproduction of Capitalism: The Role of In-
formal Justice, 9 INT'L J. OF THE SOC. OF L. 245 (1981) (infor-
mal justice as "conservative conflict" which preserves capitalist
society's structures of domination by distracting attention from
potentially "liberating conflict"); Santos, Law and Community:
The Changing Nature of State Power in Late Capitalism, 8
INT'L J. OF THE SOC. OF L. 379 (1980) (disarming and neutral-
izing function of informal and community justice reforms by
appeal to popular participation and self-government).
political process. Moreover, the Court's reliance on con-
stitutional doctrine as the basis of its opinions contributes
significantly to the appearance of impartiality and fair-
ness. For the sanctity of Supreme Court decisions de-
pends on their being viewed as based not on the personal
opinions or biases of the justices, but on higher principles
of law neutrally and objectively derived either directly or
by implication from the Constitution."
Additionally, while Supreme Court decisions natu-
rally tend to be controversial, the Court must be careful
not to so offend the power elite or public opinion as to
subject itself to scrutiny and undermine its credibility.
This constraint implies proceeding cautiously, avoiding
issues entirely until the time is ripe, dealing first with
their less controversial aspects before addressing the
more highly charged, testing out and preparing public
opinion, backing off when the reaction is too adverse, and
always deciding cases within the broad framework of
mainstream ideology.31 In short, the Court must perform
as do all effective mediators.
In its mediating role the Court must be somewhat au-
tonomous so as to be free from undue influence by the
contending parties. Autonomy enables the Court both to
detach itself sufficiently from disputes to devise workable
settlements, and to maintain the aura of impartiality and
objectivity which is necessary to gain the parties' respect
and their willingness to abide by results which may be
partly but not entirely favorable. But to be a successful
mediator the Court cannot be too autonomous, nor too
detached, not only to guard against its running rampant,
for in truth its power is limited by the power structure's
willingness to abide, but also to keep it sufficiently in
touch with the temper of the times to grasp the solutions
which will be acceptable. Thus those aspects of the Su-
preme Court which keep it in check also aid its mediating
function while ensuring that it always remains basically
supportive of Unites States-style democratic capitalism.
Finally, to be successful the Court cannot be too one-
sided in its solutions, the essence of mediation being to
give something to both sides. This explains why the Court
frequently stakes out a middle-of-the-road position, either
in a given case or over time.
3 2
The Supreme Court in Context
All constitutional disputes before the Supreme Court
arise from the contradictions of United States-style dem-
ocratic capitalism. This does not mean that all such dis-
putes directly raise issues of class struggle; racial, sexual
and religious issues, for example, may have cultural or
moral overtones as well. Left unresolved, these disputes
30. The intense media exposure in recent years regarding
Supreme Court appointments may have begun to undercut the
myth. The view that judges have axes to grind seems rather
widely held these days. It will be interesting to examine the
long-run effect of this on the Supreme Court's role as a
mediator.
31. Compare Bickel's advocacy of the Supreme Court's pas-
sive virtues. A. Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH at Il1-
98 (cited in note 14).
32. Western European societies, despite recent conservative
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risk exposing the system's contradictions and undermin-
ing the consensus on which its legitimacy depends.
In illustrating the Supreme Court's relatively autono-
mous role in helping to resolve constitutional disputes,
this section will examine three major trends in constitu-
tional law during this century. The first centers on the
anti-government approach of the Lochner era early in the
century; the second focuses on the pro-individual-rights
approach of the Warren Court and the early Burger
Court during the mid-century civil rights era; and the
third analyzes the individual rights pullback during the
modern era of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. The
thesis is that these trends are best understood not as ab-
stract debates over constitutional doctrine, but as the
Court's attempt to mediate disputes precipitating at those
moments in the history of United States-style democratic
capitalism; and that an evaluation of Supreme Court de-
cision-making is less a question of the doctrinal correct-
ness of the results than of the Court's contribution to a
successful resolution of the disputes. 3
The Lochner Era
During the Lochner era, from the early 1900's to the
mid-1930's, now largely discredited among mainstream
constitutional scholars,3 ' the Supreme Court used a vari-
ety of constitutional provisions to strike down federal and
state laws regulating private enterprise and establishing
social welfare programs. The Court invalidated statutes
regulating wages, 35 working conditions,3" prices,'3 and
trends, are still generally more socialized economically and
more advanced welfare-state-wise than the United States. The
usual explanation for this is that the United States has a more
conservative electorate or national character, resulting perhaps
from a more frontier-like spirit or less paternalistic tradition. I
suggest as well that perhaps the Supreme Court may have
something to do with this phenomenon - both by cutting short
political challenges when it rules against the dominated classes,
thereby interposing the Constitution or its authority between
them and the political process; and by providing the dominated
classes some victories outside the political process, thereby re-
ducing their opportunities to realize their potential political
power.
33. For other similar treatments of the Supreme Court, see
Freeman, Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review, in D.
Kairys, ed., THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
at 96-116 (1982); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review of Su-
preme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Klare,
Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
34. Compare, for example, J. Ely, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-
TRUST at 14-21 (cited in note 17); Sunstein, Naked Preferences
and the Constitution, 84 COL. L. REV. 1689, 1697, 1718 (1984);
L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 453-55 (cited in
note 17).
35. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)
(minimum wage for women violates due process); Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (National
Industrial Recovery Act is beyond scope of Commerce Clause
and improperly delegates Congress' law-making power).36. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (regulation
of working hours in bakeries violates due process); Schechter
Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495 (invalidating 40 hour work week).
37. Chicago, Milwaukee,& St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota,
134 U.S. 418 (1890) (railroad rate regulation unreasonable
child labor, 8 as well as laws prohibiting discrimination
against union members,39 providing subsidies to farmers
to curtail production,"0 and instituting compulsory retire-
ment and pension programs. 1 In the mid-1930's, the
Court abruptly switched gears in response both to public
pressure associated with President Roosevelt's "court
packing" plan and to the presence of Roosevelt appoin-
tees on the Court.' 2 Since then the Court has rarely in-
validated such economic legislation.
The central theme of the Lochner era cases is a Court
bent on protecting the private market from government
intervention by relying on the individualistic and laissez-
faire ideology of competitive capitalism.' To illustrate,
the Lochner Court based its invalidation of a New York
statute limiting employment in bakeries to sixty hours a
week and ten hours a day on the theory that such regula-
tion amounts to a deprivation of liberty without due pro-
cess of law:
deprivation of property without due process of law); Williams v.
Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (gasoline price regula-
tion violates due process); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238 (1936) (federal Bituminous Coal Conservation Act is be-
yond scope of Commerce Clause).
38. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (an act
which prohibits interstate transportation of goods manufactured
in violation of child labor regulations exceeds the power of Con-
gress under the Commerce Clause and invades states' rights
under the Tenth Amendment); Child Labor Tax Case, 259
U.S. 20 (1922) (Child Labor Tax Act unconstitutional).
39. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (violation
of due process clause of the Fifth Amendment); Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (violation of due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
40. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act authorizing subsidies held unconstitu-
tional because it invaded the reserved powers of the states).
41. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295
U.S. 330 (1935) (Railroad Retirement Act violates Commerce
Clause and due process).
42. For a history of the turnaround and a survey of the
cases, see L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 232-
36, 247-50, 442-55 (cited in note 17). One area of periodic
Court activism since the Lochner era has been in striking down
state economic regulation as preempted by federal law or as
overly impinging on interstate commerce. Id. at 319-69, 376-
404. In addition, the Court has at times, and perhaps for rea-
sons similar to those motivating the Lochner era majority, con-
strued federal economic regulation narrowly. See, for example,
Klare, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (cited in note 33).
43. Compare Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner:
Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIZ. L. REV.
419 (1973) (argues that Lochner era cases were attempts to
protect competitive capitalism through constitutional sanctions).
Not all Lochner era decisions struck down restrictive business
regulations. In fact, an almost equal number of regulations
were upheld, though some of these cases expose the Court's
other biases. See, for example, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908) (upholding limits on working hours for women based on
their need for special protection). See also Bunting v. Oregon,
243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding maximum working hours);
New York Central Railroad v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916)
(upholding workman's compensation law); Houston, East &
West Texas Railway v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)
(upholding intrastate railroad rate regulation); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding minimum milk price
regulation). This hodgepodge of rulings, which lends support to
the notion of the indeterminancy of constitutional doctrine, was
the result perhaps of the ability of the government to present
10
Yale Journal of Law and Liberation, Vol. 1 [1989], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjll/vol1/iss1/6
Relative Autonomy
The question of whether this act is valid as a labor
law, pure and simple, may be dismissed in a few
words. There is no reasonable ground for interfering
with the liberty of person or the right of free con-
tract, by determining the hours of labor in the occu-
pation of a baker. There is no contention that bak-
ers as a class are not equal in intelligence and
capacity to men [sic] in other trades or manual oc-
cupations, or that they are not able to assert their
rights and care for themselves without the protect-
ing arm of the State interfering with their indepen-
dence of judgment and of action."
The viability of the Court's argument in Lochner de-
pends on two empirical/ideological biases. First, the
Court assumed that employer and employee were of rela-
tively equal bargaining power. This assumption crumbles,
however, given the contrast between an employer who as
the owner of capital can sustain itself during a time of
economic hardship and who has a pool of surplus labor
on which to call, and an employee who relies totally on
the next paycheck for survival and can ill afford even a
short period of unemployment. Rather than a fair ex-
change, a contract reached under such conditions exem-
plifies domination and exploitation. Moreover, while it is
possible to read Lochner in isolation as holding only that
the government failed to prove a lack of comparable bar-
gaining power in that case, it seems unlikely that any
amount of evidence would have sufficed." Empirical
facts, like texts, are subject to varying interpretations;
what to one person is an arms length transaction is over-
more convincing arguments in some cases than others; or per-
haps of the Court's desire, given the public support for much of
the legislation it struck down, not to be so one-sided in its deci-
sions as to undermine its ability to perform its mediating
function.
44. 198 U.S. at 57. This decision spurred Justice Holmes to
his famous dissent, which is now the prevailing scholarly and
judicial view: "[A] constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the or-
ganic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire." Id.
at 75.
45. In Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915) the Court
inferred that the government has no right to interfere with free-
dom of contract even in the face of unequal bargaining power,
again emphasizing the ideology of individualism:
[lt is said ... to be a matter of common knowledge that'employees, as a rule, are not financially able to be as
independent in making contracts for the sale of their la-
bor as are employers in making contracts for the
purchase thereof.'. . Indeed a little reflection will show
that wherever the right of private property and the right
of free contract co-exist, each party when contracting is
inevitably more or less influenced by the question whether
he has much property, or little, or none; for the contract
is made to the very end that each man [sic] may gain
something that he [sic] needs or desires more urgently
than that which he [sic] proposes to give in exchange.
And, since it is self-evident that, unless all things are held
in common, some persons must have more property than
others, it is from the nature of things impossible to up-
hold freedom of contract and the right of private property
without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those
inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the
exercise of those rights.
reaching to another. The Supreme Court's anti-statist/
pro-laissez-faire bias at the time of Lochner predisposed
it to view the employment relationship in a far different
light than would a Marxist looking at the same facts."'
Second, the Supreme Court's anti-statist/pro-laissez-
faire bias in Lochner also predisposed it to view the em-
ployment relationship as a purely private affair rather
than as a collective concern."7 If one views an individual
employment contract, however, as connected with an
overall employment process which affects everyone, and
if one views all society's members as interdependent, then
the employment relationship becomes a matter of great
public moment. Since it is possible in a culture which dis-
tinguishes between the private and the public to argue
that any nominally private activity has some public im-
pact, the carving out of a private sphere entails a judg-
ment about which concerns of the public are legitimate
and which are not. Underlying Lochner and its progeny,
therefore, is an ideologically based policy decision that
the employment relationship and other economic matters
should fall on the private side of the public-private
boundary. But that the Constitution is susceptible to be-
ing interpreted both ways on this point is evidenced by
the great deference the Supreme Court has accorded eco-
nomic regulation since that time."8
In context, the Supreme Court's anti-statist stance
during the Lochner era is one chapter in the history of
the struggle for economic dominance between competitive
and monopoly capital. In large part this was an interne-
cine struggle, with capitalist pitted against capitalist. The
proponents of competitive capital, mostly smaller and
medium size entrepreneurs, tended toward a laissez-faire
economic system with government intervention confined
to rules which facilitate exchange and preserve competi-
tion. Monopoly capital, on the other hand, has demanded
a partnership with big government both in order to stabi-
lize the economy in times of crisis and, in particular, to
promote growth through such measures as the sanction-
ing of monopolistic or oligopolistic practices,' 9 the impo-
sition of regulatory restrictions on entry into the market,
imperialistic ventures to secure foreign markets and ex-
ploit foreign labor and resources, and direct government
subsidies. All of these measures may hurt smaller firms
either by giving monopoly capital a market advantage or
draining from the economy money which might otherwise
46. Compare, H. Braverman, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAP-
ITAL (1974).
47. Compare, Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal
Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW at 18, 23-26 (cited in note
33).
48. For a scholarly view advocating renewed judicial activ-
ism in support of economic liberties, see B. Siegan, ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980).
49. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act might be cited to the con-
trary as an example of the political process' support of competi-
tive capitalism. As a practical matter, though, the Sherman Act
has done little to stop the growth of monopoly capital, illustrat-
ing the ability of the dominant economic forces to overcome
seeming legal constraints.
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be spent on their goods."0
This analysis does not imply that the Lochner era
cases themselves involved disputes between competitive
and monopoly capitalists. For the emergence of monopoly
capital, by enhancing the dominance of capital over labor
and by reducing people's opportunities for independent
means of support, also gave rise to mass political de-
mands culminating in the modern welfare state. While
capitalists of all stripes may have opposed it, the welfare
state seems an indispensable concomitant of the era of
monopoly capital representing the mediation through the
relatively autonomous political process of a conflict
threatening the stability of the system. For this reason, in
the eyes of many analysts, the New Deal was the savior
of United States-style democratic capitalism at a time
when radical thinking and the potential for revolutionary
change were at their height"
In retrospect it seems that the Supreme Court's anti-
statist stance during the Lochner era was a futile attempt
to block the development of big government and the wel-
fare state accompanying the emergence of monopoly cap-
ital. Rather than helping to mediate the conflicts arising
out of the emergence of monopoly capital, the Court, de-
pending on one's perspective, either stood in the way of
50. Compare, P. Baran & P. Sweezy, MONOPOLY CAPITAL:
AN ESSAY ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER
at 52-217 (1966); J.K. Galbraith, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC
PURPOSE at 155-63, 179-97 (1973). Baran's and Sweezy's posi-
tion is that government spending is necessary under monopoly
capitalism because of the need to create demand to utilize the
unused surplus produced by monopoly capital's rampant growth
and the constant effort to increase profits. In a sense govern-
ment spending is of general benefit in that without it there
would be more unemployment and less funds available for the
goods and services of smaller entrepreneurs. But since this
spending predominately benefits monopoly capital, defense
spending and highway programs being the best examples, it also
enhances monopoly capital's economic dominance. The ortho-
dox socialist response to monopoly capital has been to advocate
the socialization of the means of production, and particularly of
the giant corporations, in order to make the economy more re-
sponsive to the public good. Galbraith, on the other hand, ar-
gues for socializing some of the more competitive sectors of the
economy, such as housing and health care, in order to put them
on a more equal footing with monopoly capital. J.K. Galbraith,
ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE at 275-85.
51. Compare, for example, G. Dumhoff, THE HIGHER CIR-
CLES: THE GOVERNING CLASS IN AMERICA at 233-49 (1970); J.
Greenstone, LABOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS at 46 (1977). The
contradiction between capitalist and power elite opposition to
the mediation of the political and judicial processes and the no-
tion that those processes help to preserve capitalist and power
elite domination is more apparent than real. The self-interest or
narrower perspective of individual elites might well lead them
to oppose particular reforms which collective or more detached
decision-making processes might view as needed pacification.
For example, it is in the interest of individual capitalists to op-
pose the unionization of their plants lest they lose profits or be
put at a competitive disadvantage. Yet legislation or court rul-
ings protecting the right to unionize might make it more palat-
able to capitalists as a whole by ensuring that all competitors
will be unionized; and it also may be to their long run advan-
tage if it mollifies workers, perhaps even without undercutting
profits if the added labor costs can be passed on to consumers.
Compare note 22 and note 61.
the compromises and adjustments worked out through
the political process, or lacked the power to withstand the
growing dominance of monopoly capital and the welfare
state. Consequently, the political process was able to con-
strain the Court, both through the appointment of jus-
tices more favorable to government intervention and by
generating unfavorable public opinion against the Court.
The bitter defeat suffered by the Court during the Loch-
ner era - signifying the new economic, political, and
ideological hegemony of the proponents of monopoly cap-
ital and the welfare state - explains the Court's reluc-
tance since then to intervene in economic matters far bet-
ter than does the notion that the Court committed any
error in doctrinal analysis.
The Civil Rights Era
In contrast to the Supreme Court's reluctance to in-
tervene in economic issues since the Lochner era, it has
been highly active in other areas of constitutional law.
During the civil rights era between the early 1950's and
the early 1970's, the Warren Court and the early Burger
Court vigorously championed a variety of civil rights
claims. The explanation for this divergent treatment of
economic and civil rights claims lies not in any inherent
doctrinal differences between them, but in the fact that
the hegemony of monopoly-capital and the welfare-state
had largely been achieved by this time and that civil
rights issues were then in need of mediation.
Moreover, the Supreme Court seems to have been a
more successful mediator in the civil rights era than in
the Lochner era. To illustrate, I shall discuss three areas
of individual rights activism by the Warren and early
Burger Courts: the protection of ethnic minorities, the
reformation of the political process, and the establish-
ment of a right of sexual liberty. The Court's doctrinal
analysis in all of these cases was mainstream liberal re-
volving around either of two issues; the limits of govern-
ment intervention into people's private spheres; and the
benefits the government must affirmatively accord people
in order to ensure their human dignity.
In the Court's answers to these questions, the ideology
of individualism and the rhetoric of rights abound just as
in the Lochner era. And as in the Lochner era, the
Court's civil rights era decisions entail policy judgments
not compelled by constitutional doctrine. This comment
is not intended to denigrate in any way the Supreme
Court's achievements in the civil rights era; while its de-
cisions leave intact many of the injustices of United
States-style democratic capitalism, they still represent
real, if limited, advances from a humanistic perspective.
Rather, I would argue that the Court's civil rights era
decisions are best understood in historical context and in
terms of the Court's mediating role.
The protection of ethnic minorities - The greatest
achievement of the Warren Court was the invalidation of
government mandated racial segregation, i.e., United
States apartheid. In Brown v. Board of Education,"2 the
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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leading case in this area, the Court struck down enforced
segregation in public schools. Once again, the Court em-
ployed mainstream liberal rhetoric emphasizing the val-
ues of democracy and equality of opportunity:
Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments. Compul-
sory school attendance laws and the great expendi-
tures for education both demonstrate our recogni-
tion of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the perform-
ance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very founda-
tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal in-
strument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him [sic] for later professional train-
ing, and in helping him [sic] to adjust normally to
his [sic] environment. In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to suc-
ceed in life if he [sic] is denied the opportunity of
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must
be made available to all on equal terms.5"
Mandatory segregation is undemocratic and unequal,
according to the Court, because such discrimination pins
a badge of inferiority on Blacks, thereby denying their
equal worthiness as human beings. By contemporary
moral standards, this insight seems difficult to refute. In
retrospect, it is hard to believe that the Court was forth-
right in its assertion of the opposite point of view when in
Plessy v. Ferguson4 it upheld mandatory segregation a
half century earlier . 5 The divergent results in Brown and
Plessy illustrate the value-laden judgments underlying
both cases; the Brown Court's interpretation of the mean-
ing of equal protection differs markedly from that of the
Plessy Court. Moreover, implicit in Brown is a relatively
non-interpretivist approach to construing the Constitu-
tion, particularly given substantial evidence that the orig-
inal intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was not to ban
enforced segregation.56 Thus, the very choice to follow ei-
ther the Brown or Plessy approach entails a debatable
policy judgment not mandated by the Constitution.5
However laudable the result, on a doctrinal level the
issue in Brown was no more determined by the Constitu-
53. 347 U.S. at 493.
54. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
55. Justice Harlan's lone dissent in Plessy sets forth even
more eloquently than Brown the liberal value of equality before
the law with which enforced segregation conflicts:
[lI]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there
is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal
before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most pow-
erful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account
of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.
163 U.S. at 559.
56. Compare, R. Berger, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
117-33 (cited in note 14).
57. See note 17.
tion than were the issues in the Lochner era cases. Thus
Brown's significance, and Plessy's as well, must be un-
derstood in historical context. Plessy grew out of the po-
litical compromise following the Civil War which re-
stored control of the South to its former and emerging
power elite.58 Enforced segregation was an aspect of a re-
vised social structure which enabled the power elite to
continue exploiting Blacks much as under slavery.59 By
appealing to the myth of Black inferiority, this social
structure thwarted the possibility of populist alliances be-
tween Blacks and other oppressed southerners, isolated
Blacks from the political process, and rendered them
powerless.60 Plessy represented an attempt to enlist the
judiciary to undercut this oppressive social structure.
While the Court's decision to uphold segregation is repre-
hensible, one may nevertheless view it as a successful me-
diation from an elite perspective in the sense that it con-
tributed to the legitimacy and stability of the United
States-style democratic capitalism of that era.6" By put-
ting the Supreme Court's stamp of approval on the post-
Civil War compromise, the Plessy decision, although per-
petuating opppression, both abetted the nation's reunifi-
cation and enabled it to avoid addressing the evils of ra-
cism for some fifty years.
While moral revulsion to slavery as well as social and
political factors contributed significantly to the Civil
War, economic factors were overriding. The dispute over
the continuation and extension of slavery, the lifeblood of
the southern agrarian economy, was central to the strug-
gle for economic dominance between southern agrarian-
ism and northern industrial capitalism. 2 It is possible, in
58. Compare, Billings, Class Origins of the New South:
Planter Persistence and Industry in North Carolina, in MARX-
IST INQUIRIES at 52-83 (1982); J. Mandle, THE ROOTS OF
BLACK POVERTY: SOUTHERN PLANTATION ECONOMY AFTER
THE CIVIL WAR (1978); M. Wayne, THE RESHAPING OF PLAN-
TATION SOCIETY (1983); C.V. Woodward, THE ORIGINS OF THE
NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913 (1951); C.V. Woodward, REUNION
AND REACTION (1966). There has been a scholarly debate in
the above works, which is unnecessary to resolve here, over the
extent to which power in the New South resided more in the old
planter class or the emerging industrial elite. The truth proba-
bly lies somewhere in between and is a question of degree de-
pending on the time and locale.
59. Compare, J. Mandle, THE ROOTS OF BLACK POVERTY;
Weiner, Class Structure and Economic Development in the
American South, 1865-1955, 84 AM. HIST. REV. 970 (Oct.
1979).
60. See C.V. Woodward, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM
CROW (1957).
61. In this regard Plessy stands in sharp contrast to Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), the Supreme
Court's infamous pre-Civil War race case. In Dred Scott the
Court struck down the Missouri Compromise, which attempted
to mediate the slavery issue politically by permitting it in part
and banning it in part of the western territories. If it did not
make the Civil War inevitable, Dred Scott most certainly
speeded it up. Although a victory for one slave owner, Dred
Scott was thus a disaster to the power elite on both sides be-
cause it stood in the way of at least a temporary political medi-
ation of a dispute which threatened to tear the system asunder.
62. See C. Beard & M. Beard, 2 THE RISE OF AMERICAN
CIVILIZATION at 3-121 (1928); L. Hacker, THE TRIUMPH OF
AMERICAN CAPITALISM at 199-373 (1940).
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fact, to interpret the Civil War as an early battle in the
conflict between competitive capitalists represented by
the agrarian South and emerging monopoly capitalists
represented by the industrialized North. 3 The North's
victory in the Civil War greatly contributed to the grow-
ing dominance of monopoly capital over the succeeding
century. In the interim the South suffered economic stag-
nation -a consequence in large part of the North's
hands-off approach to the South embodied in the post
Civil War compromise sanctioned by the Supreme Court
in Plessy."
By the middle of the twentieth century, though, the
time had arrived to bring the South into the fold of mod-
ern-day United States-style democratic capitalism. The
Supreme Court's undermining of enforced segregation
represented, in great part, a response to the need to pro-
mote the integration of the South into the modern eco-
nomic order. As with the Civil War, moral revulsion to
racism and other noneconomic factors played a part in
the desegregation movement. Yet at least as significant is
the economic explanation that ending United States
apartheid served the interests of United States-style dem-
ocratic capitalism both domestically and internationally.
Domestically, several factors suggest that the time
was at hand to desegregate the South: time had healed to
a degree the wounds opened by the Civil War; the grow-
ing class consciousness within the Black community
threatened social instability; and the underdeveloped
South offered an inviting pool of cheap labor. 5 Yet en-
forced segregation stood in the way of the South's eco-
nomic development by creating economic inefficiency and
engendering social conflict, which greatly inhibited indus-
trial movement to the region. Segregated workplaces
were cumbersome to maintain; the risk of racial upheaval
63. While acknowledging this as one possible interpretation
of the Civil War, Geneovese has argued that the War's roots
lay in the fact that southern plantation slavery was a pre-
capitalist, prebourgeois, seigneurial or serf-like system with a
world view and a way of life fundamentally incompatible with
the capitalistic hegemony being achieved in the outside world
(i.e., the rest of the country and Europe) with which the South
was so intimately tied. See E. D. Genovese, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF SLAVERY (1965) and THE WORLD THE SLAVE-
HOLDERS MADE (1969). Either way, the North's victory in the
Civil War can be seen as contributing to the emergence of mo-
nopoly capital.
64. Weiner, 84 AMER. HIST. REV. 970, (cited in note 59),
focusing more on agriculture, attributes the South's economic
stagnation to its reliance on quasi-feudal bound labor and debt
peonage, coupled with governmental limitations on free move-
ment, as against the wage labor and more capital intensive ap-
proach of northern capitalism. Wood, focusing more on the tex-
tile industry, argues rather that southern social and material
development stagnated, despite high rates of capital accumula-
tion, due to a large, unskilled, impoverished labor force, re-
stricted labor market competition, and the absence of unions or
laws protective of labor, thus enabling southern capital to ex-
tract relatively greater surplus value, P. Wood, SOUTHERN CAP-
ITALISM (1986). Goldfield, has characterized the South until re-
cently as quasi-feudal and quasi-colonial, D. Goldfield, COTTON
FIELDS AND SKYSCRAPERS (1982)
65. See P. Wood, SOUTHERN CAPITALISM.
could not be ignored; and the reservation of the better
jobs for whites, while Blacks were confined to more me-
nial tasks, prevented employers from assigning workers so
as to maximize their skills and productivity. It is not co-
incidental that the economic development of the South
has been accompanied by the Court-prompted elimina-
tion of enforced segregation.
Internationally, the extension of capital into develop-
ing countries depends to a great degree on promoting am-
icable relations with the ruling elites, not to minimize the
centrality of military force and power politics. Funda-
mental here is a nation's standing in the international
community. As the example of South Africa shows, it
would have been difficult for the United States, while
still practicing apartheid, to establish good relations with
developing countries (particularly those with a colonial
past), or to maintain its international standing. Thus, the
Supreme Court's repudiation of enforced segregation di-
rectly served the interests of United States-based interna-
tional capitalists and the United States capitalist
system.66
The contrast between the Supreme Court's role in dis-
mantling apartheid and its role in the Lochner era is
striking. In the latter instance, having initially acted to
deter the political process from making adjustments
needed to sustain United States-style democratic capital-
ism, the Court was forced in the end to back down to
political pressure. In the former instance, on the other
hand, the Court was instrumental in fostering needed ad-
justments which the political process was unable to ac-
complish itself and which consequently have stood the
test of time. Reform was not possible in the South since
Blacks were deprived of the vote and segregationists con-
trolled the political process. Reform was also difficult on
a national level in light of the unity of southern states on
this issue and their power as a voting bloc in Congress.
Nevertheless, national public opinion, if not yet generally
opposed to segregation, was ready to be swayed by the
Supreme Court's liberal rhetoric against racial segrega-
tion. There were even those among the southern power
elite who were prepared to accept the end of segregation,
but feared addressing the issue due to the strength of the
prevailing racist sentiments. 7
Does this mean that the South would continue to
practice apartheid had the Supreme Court not stepped
into the breach in the political process? Given the inter-
est of the country as a whole to be rid of enforced segre-
gation, civil rights legislation may eventually have found
its way through Congress despite southern opposition and
without judicial prodding. It is also possible that southern
segregationists would have ultimately realized that en-
forced segregation was contrary to their interests, and
66. On the convergence of interests between the Black com-
munity and the power elite, see Bell, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV.
518 (1980).
67. Compare E. Jacoway & D. Colburn, eds., SOUTHERN
BUSINESSMEN AND DESEGREGATION (1982).
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would have voluntarily dismantled it. This possibility
may explain the fairly rapid acceptance of desegregation
in the South despite early virulent opposition,6 8 as well as
anti-apartheid sentiments in some sectors of the South
African business community. In any event, the Supreme
Court certainly contributed to the demise of enforced
apartheid, just as in an earlier era it had sanctioned it. In
so doing, the Court served the interests of United States-
style democratic capitalism at least as much as those of
the black community.
No doubt this society remains highly racist. And that
the government continues to be involved in racism, if less
overtly than in the past, illustrates the limitations of the
judiciary's ability to change the system. Nevertheless,
credit must be accorded the Supreme Court for initiating
meaningful reform. Today, though, as it becomes more
and more apparent that the reforms of the civil rights era
have not led to equality, particularly of economic oppor-
tunity, a growing resentment is mounting within the
black community. In the not too distant future, this re-
newed class consciousness may well erupt in social up-
heaval reminiscent of the civil rights era. Thus, while the
Supreme Court may have successfully mediated the con-
flict for a time, the Court did not solve, and is probably
incapable of solving, the underlying contradictions which
have produced it.
The reformation of the political process - The most
notable of the Warren Court's efforts in this area is rep-
resented by the one-person-one-vote rule which dramati-
cally altered the structures of the House of Representa-
tives and state houses across the land. 9 Prior to the rule,
the House and many state legislatures were composed of
districts of greatly disparate population. Now, as the re-
sult of Supreme Court intervention, district lines must
periodically be redrawn on an equal population basis.
Just as in Brown, the Court's rhetoric emphasizes the
ideology of democracy and equal opportunity, as most co-
gently expressed in Reynolds v. Sims:
[RIepresentative government is in essence self-gov-
ernment through the medium of elected representa-
68. Much of this acceptance is attributable to the moderat-
ing influence of "enlightened" segments of the southern power
elite. Whether this moderation was the result of a change of
heart regarding race relations, economic self-interest, or a re-
luctant yielding to some reform in order to preserve as much as
possible of the status quo, has been the subject of scholarly de-
bate. Compare E. Jacoway & D. Colburn, SOUTHERN Busi-
NESSMEN, with N. Bartley, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE:
RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950's (1977).
Either way, in terms of the thesis of this paper, southern ac-
ceptance of desegregation is an example of the Supreme Court's
ability to mediate a highly divisive dispute in a way which legit-
imized a reformed social order still consonant with the domi-
nance of the power elite.
69. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying the
one-person-one-vote rule to election of members of the House of
Representatives); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (ap-
plying same to state legislatures); Avery v. Midland County,
390 U.S. 474 (1968) (applying same to subunits of state
government).
tives of the people, and each and every citizen has
an inalienable right to full and effective participa-
tion in the political processes of his [sic] State's leg-
islative bodies. Most citizens can achieve this par-
ticipation only as qualified voters through the
election of legislators to represent them. Full and
effective participation by all citizens in state gov-
ernment requires, therefore, that each citizen have
an equally effective voice in the election of mem-
bers of his [sic] state legislature. Modern and viable
state government needs, and the Constitution de-
mands, no less.
70
Despite the rhetoric, the connection between one-per-
son-one-vote and "full and effective participation" in gov-
ernment or "an equally effective voice" in elections is
highly debatable. In the first place, it is difficult to define
effective participation and an equally effective voice.
Clearly, these concepts do not mean winning on every is-
sue. But could one be a loser on every issue and still be
said to have an effective voice? Or does effectiveness de-
pend on one's being victorious at least sometimes, and if
so how often? Does it depend on the nature of the issue?
If the substantive outcome matters, then a departure
from one-person-one-vote may at times be necessary to
assure full and equal effectiveness.7 1 For instance, where
a cohesive majority controls the political process and con-
sistently disregards the interests of the minority, there
may be a case for according somewhat greater weight to
minority votes in order to counteract majority tyranny.
There is also an argument for differential voting strength
as to issues which may have greater impact on some than
others. The super-majority requirement to amend the
Constitution, whose justification is in part to protect mi-
nority rights, is an example functionally equivalent to un-
equal population districts of counting minority votes more
heavily.
One-person-one-vote, however, is a per se rule which
does not allow for such variations in the elections to
which it applies. 72 It is therefore not concerned with sub-
stantive outcomes, but is rather a rule of formal equality.
Everyone's vote must count the same and carry the same
weight. In that way, whether on the winning or losing
side, everyone theoretically has comparable influence on
the outcome. But that is an obvious fallacy in light of
existing disparities in the distribution of power and
wealth. Those in positions of power and those with
money, who are already members of the power elite or
70. 377 U.S. at 565.
71. Compare R. Dixon, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION:
REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS (1968); M. Shapiro,
LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT at 227-32 (1964).
72. It has been argued that while the Court may have rec-
ognized that one-person-one-vote did not assure equally effec-
tive participation, it adopted the rule, in order to correct an ob-
viously irrational situation, because of the inappropriateness or
administrative difficulty of the Court's inquiring into the work-
ings of the political process. See J. Ely, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-
TRUST at 120-24 (cited in note 17). I would stress instead the
symbolic value of a rule which treats everyone as formally equal
in helping to create the myth of substantive equality in practice.
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are the beneficiaries of United States-style democratic
capitalism, have far greater influence on elections and
law-making than those whose influence is limited largely
to their votes. In short, while the one-person-one-vote rule
may or may not have some equalizing impact on people's
political power, the underlying rhetoric of equal partici-
pation is a myth which masks the fact that in the politi-
cal process the influence of the power elite predominates.
In addition, the reapportionment cases' rhetorical fo-
cus on public electoral politics as the essence of democ-
racy masks the fact that true democracy, in the sense of
full and effective participation, demands an effective
voice not only in electoral politics but in other nominally
private areas of life as well. The most notable area is the
workplace, where the power elite's predominance is
greater even than in the political process .7 Likewise the
one-person-one-vote rule, in line with United States-style
democratic capitalism's ideology of individualism, masks
the fact that political power is more a group than an indi-
vidual phenomenon; and that what matters in achieving
electoral power is not only that one's vote counts as much
as everyone else's, but that like-minded people are able to
pool their voting strength in effective ways. In this regard
the winner-take-all/two-party system in this country en-
hances the power elite's domination of the political pro-
cess by enabling it to stifle the effective voice of those
with divergent views. Imagine the power, for example, of
the Rainbow Coalition if there were proportional repre-
sentation in Congress. Proportional representation would
do far more than the one-person-one-vote rule to ensure
the effective political participation of the relatively pow-
erless. However, the Supreme Court will likely never
mandate proportional representation due to the various
factors constraining the Court from initiating reform det-
rimental to the power structure.
Indeed, as with the Court's invalidation of apartheid,
the one-person-one-vote rule affirmatively serves the in-
terests of capital and particularly of monopoly capitalists.
Prior to the reapportionment cases, both the House of
Representatives and many state legislatures were seri-
ously malapportioned in favor of rural areas. The effect
of the one-person-one-vote rule has been to transfer polit-
ical power to urban areas, where the influence of indus-
trial and international capital is greater since that is
where its beneficiaries live. True, reapportionment has
also enhanced the political power of poor and minority
central city dwellers, a potential anti-capitalist force.
This is undercut, however, by the fact that the greatest
power shift has been to the more conservative suburban
areas which tend to dominate United States politics7 ' and
that the political' power of the poor and minorities is lim-
ited by a lack of funds and their submergence in the two-
party system. As with desegregation, moreover, the Su-
preme Court's intervention in the reapportionment cases
73. See H. Braverman, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL
(cited in note 46).
74. Compare, R. Dixon, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION at
586-87 (cited in note 71); Hanson & Crew, The Policy Impact
of Reapportionment, 8 L. & Soc. REV. 69 (1973).
initiated a reform which the political process itself could
not accomplish because state legislatures, the very bodies
responsible for creating electoral districts, were them-
selves malapportioned.
The one-person-one-vote rule is thus another example
of successful Supreme Court mediation. It affirmed the
ideology of democracy and of the equal worth of every
person as a political being, thereby promoting the legiti-
macy of the system and diverting attention from more
serious inequities in power in both the public and private
spheres. And it did so without interfering with, and in
fact buttressing, the power elite's political hegemony. It
remains to be seen, though, whether the illusion of equal
political participation will persist, given this society's
widening wealth disparities and the political process' de-
creasing responsiveness to the poor. Widespread expres-
sions of mistrust for politicians and the widespread fail-
ure of many United States citizens to vote is some
indication that people do not fully buy the myth.
Sexual liberty - The leading cases here are those
protecting sexually explicit speech,7 5 private sexual activ-
ities76 and particularly the right to an abortion recog-
nized early on by the Burger Court.7 While the abortion
decision, Roe v. Wade, is the most controversial of these
rulings, the most eloquent expression of the underlying
liberal ideology of a private sphere beyond the purview of
government is contained in the Warren Court's decision
in Griswold v. Connecticut 8 There the Court struck
down as applied to married people a law prohibiting the
use of and the dispensing of information regarding
contraceptives:
Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner
v. New York . . . should be our guide. But we de-
cline that invitation . . . We do not sit as a super-
legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and pro-
priety of laws that touch economic problems, busi-
ness affairs, or social conditions. This law, however,
operates directly on an intimate relation of husband
and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of
that relation...
We deal with a right of privacy older than the
Bill of Rights - older than our political parties,
older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring,
and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes;
a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
75. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (articulat-
ing test for obscenity as speech which appeals to prurient inter-
est according to the average person and contemporary commu-
nity standards); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(defining speech appealing to prurient interest as that which is
patently offensive and lacks serious value as a whole).
76. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding pri-
vate possession of obscene material as constitutionally
protected).
77. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
78. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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an association for as noble a purpose as any in-
volved in our prior decisions."
Here, despite its protestations to the contrary, the
Court comes full circle to Lochner. Only now it is not the
economic sphere of life which the Court regards as be-
yond the purview of government, a premise which the
Warren Court fully rejects, but one's sexual life both in
and out of wedlock. 80 But what is it that makes sex more
private than economics? Economic activity certainly has
a public side to it in that what happens in one sector of
the economy has a ripple effect throughout. But nomi-
nally private sexual activity also has potential public im-
pact. One's sexual practices reflect one's sexual values
which cannot be kept totally hidden but will inevitably
find public expression in one way or another. These val-
ues thereby impact society's sexual mores, which in turn
are interrelated with society's mores generally.
This does not mean that sexual activity should be reg-
ulated. It does mean that the Supreme Court's decision
to cordon off sexuality (or at least heterosexuality"1 )
from government intervention is ultimately a debatable
value judgment about the type of society one favors. For
example, those who favor the right to abortion feel it con-
tributes to women's liberation, while those opposed be-
lieve it constitutes murder and leads to the breakdown of
the family.8 2 A similiar debate revolves around the legali-
zation of pornography, with one side arguing that legali-
zation enhances people's freedom of choice and the other
side arguing that it has unleashed an essentially exploi-
tive industry.8 3
If liberal ideology cannot make a principled distinc-
tion on a doctrinal level between economics and sexuality,
then the distinction must lie in the context. As noted
above, the Lochner era context was the struggle between
monopoly and competitive capital, and the related issue
of the modern welfare state; and the Supreme Court's in-
tervention was unsuccessful either because of the inevita-
bility of the monopoly-capitalist/welfare-state victory, or
because those forces were simply too strong to be coun-
tered. The Court's sexual liberty decisions, on the other
hand, seem a more successful effort at mediation.
Sexual liberty in context is related largely to the
class-like struggle of women against male domination.
While not peculiar to capitalist societies, female subjuga-
tion has thrived under United States-style democratic
79. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82, 486.
80. Griswold was extended to unmarried people in Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
81. See note 124.
82. Compare, K. Luker, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF
MOTHERHOOD (1984); Glen, Understanding the Abortion De-
bate: A Legal, Constitutional and Political Framework, 89 So-
CIALIST REV. 51 (1986).
83. Compare, MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. &
POL. REV. 321 (1984); A. Dworkin, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POS-
SESSING WOMEN (1981); A. Soble, PORNOGRAPHY: MARXISM,
FEMINISM, AND THE FUTURE OF SEXUALITY (1986); M.
Valverde, SEX, POWER AND PLEASURE (1985).
capitalism and generally in capitalist societies.8" While
also having cultural and religious overtones, male
supremacy is largely based on the exploitation of
women's labor. This can be seen in both the contracep-
tion and abortion controversies. The absence of contra-
ception and restrictions on abortion mean larger families,
which historically have forced women into the roles of
caretaker and homemaker; and by having children they
do not desire and cannot support, women become depen-
dent on men and are precluded from competing in the
employment market on equal terms, particularly in a so-
ciety lacking adequate day care provisions.85
Supreme Court mediation of this conflict has been
successful because freeing women from the rigors of child
rearing serves the interests of advanced capitalism by en-
abling women to enter the labor force and be more pro-
ductive workers - the staying power of advanced capi-
talism being its ability to create ever increasing material
demands, which in turn requires more workers to produce
the desired goods. Thus, although the Supreme Court's
sexual liberty rulings may pacify women by alleviating
male domination, the rulings may result in the substitu-
tion of capitalist exploitation in its place. Also contribut-
ing to the success of the Supreme Court's mediation is
the widespread popular support of its sexual liberty rul-
ings, albeit in the face of vehement opposition within seg-
ments of the public and of academia8 6. Moreover, as with
the desegregation and voting rights controversies, the po-
litical process was unable to effect a resolution. In part
this is because men still predominate among elected offi-
cials; and in part because the opposition, particularly the
religious right, is well organized and determined. By re-
moving such heated conflicts from the political process
the Supreme Court can assist in stabilizing the system
-as long, that is, as the Court is successful in its media-




During the modern era the Burger/Rehnquist Court
84. Compare, MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,
and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (Spring,
1982); Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, THE
POLITICS OF LAW at 294-303 (cited in note 33); Rifkin, Toward
a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, MARXISM AND LAW at 295-
301 (cited in note 4); Thomas, Citizenship and Gender in Work
Organization: Some Considerations for Theories of the Labor
Process, MARXIST INQUIRIES at 86-112 (1982).
85. Compare, Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: La-
bor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REv. 55
(1979).
86. Compare, for example, Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:
A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Ep-
stein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name - The
Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 159. The academic cri-
tique speaks mostly to the argued inappropriateness of the Su-
preme Court's overriding the political process with regard to
abortion, on the ground that such a right cannot legitimately be
found in the Constitution. For a counter proposal, see L. Tribe,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 929-33 (cited in note 17).
87. During the decade prior to Roe, approximately one
third of all states had liberalized their abortion laws without
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has not developed as consistent a philosophy as the Loch-
ner era and Warren Courts appear to have done.88 In
large part this is due to the Court's having been fairly
evenly divided along liberal, conservative, and moderate
lines - although all within the confines of mainstream
thinking. Nonetheless, the Burger/Rehnquist Court has
been noticeably less active than the Warren. Court on be-
half of individual rights as against the government. None
of the major Warren Court rulings has been reversed, but
in most instances there has been a narrowing of their
scope and a reluctance to extend them further."
It would therefore not be fair to say that the Burger/
much fanfare, mostly along the lines of the American Law In-
stitute's model statute authorizing abortion where necessary to
protect the life or health (including the mental health) of the
mother. In California at least, the practical effect was to make
abortion available on demand. K. Luker, ABORTION AND THE
POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD at 41, 92-94 (cited in note 82).
Whether the liberalization process would have continued is un-
certain. If so, then it might be argued that the Supreme Court
expended its prestige unwisely and needlessly put its legitimacy
on the line. It certainly seems fair to say that Roe has
politicized the Court, and has exposed the ideological nature of
Court decision-making, more than any other case in recent
years. In other instances when the Court has put itself on the
line, such as in the Brown case, its decisions have stood the test
of time. Whether the same will be true of Roe only time will
tell.
88. For evaluations of the Burger Court's work, see H.
Schwartz, ed., THE BURGER YEARS (1987); V. Blasi, THE BUR-
GER COURT (1983).
89. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts also display a bur-
geoning states' rights thrust somewhat reminiscent of the Loch-
ner era. The states' rights position often loses and was dealt a
severe blow in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Nevertheless, the states' rights ad-
vocates, notably Chief Justice Rehnquist, number several of the
Court's younger members and are likely to increase if conserva-
tive presidents are in office much longer. See Kleven, 8 VT. L.
REV. I (cited in note 12). The rhetoric of many of the opinions
advancing states' rights speaks to democratic principles. For ex-
ample, in his dissenting opinion in Garcia Justice Powell based
his argument for constitutional limitations on federal power to
regulate state and local governments on "the far more effective
role of self-government at the state and local levels." 469 U.S.
at 576. This highly debatable policy judgment is based less, I
would argue, on a genuine commitment of the judicial conserva-
tives to democracy than on their desire to contribute to the de-
regulation movement of the modern era. See Blum, Greaney,
Hanifin & Sousa, Cases that Shake the Conscience: Reflections
on Criticism of the Burger Court, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV.
713, 715 (1980) (characterizing the Burger Court's perform-
ance as "judicial deregulation of persons and entities wielding
power in American society"); Greer, Deregulation Fever Hits
the Supreme Court, THE NATION 666 (Dec. 20, 1980). While
the federal government positively supports monopoly capital
and the power elite in many ways, the capitalist power structure
views much federal regulation as interfering with their major
objectives, namely pursuing profits and economic dominance.
Hence the deregulation movement is designed not to reduce the
federal government to the minimalism of the nineteenth cen-
tury, but to cut back on overintrusive regulation while still re-
taining federal support for monopoly capital. Since state gov-
ernments tend to be less powerful, more easily dominated by
monied interests, less likely to interfere with business, and less
supportive of the disadvantaged than the federal government, it
serves these justices' conservative ideology to advance states'
rights whenever possible. Decentralized decision-making does
hold a prominent place in egalitarian socialist theory as a way
to foster grass-roots democracy, Albert & Hahnel, Socialist Ec-
Rehnquist Court has been anti-individual rights, al-
though there may be particular justices who lean in that
direction. Rather this has been a period of accommoda-
tion, of giving something to both sides, of sometimes rul-
ing in favor of the individual and sometimes of the gov-
ernment, and of attempting to balance competing
individual rights claims. In so doing the Court has drawn
fine lines in distinguishing and rationalizing the diverse
outcomes. These fine lines reflect neither the logical nor
objective development of the underlying doctrine, but the
Court's collective judgment on which of the competing
liberal values at stake in most of these cases should take
precedence. The result has been a hodgepodge of rulings
hard to reconcile with each other on any basis other than
an on-going policy debate within the Court which mirrors
the debate in society at large.
This is not to say that the Court's balancing act has
been deliberately planned. This is simply the way the
Court has come to function as the result of numerous his-
torical factors-some explicable and some fortui-
tous-and even irrational. In context it may be that the
Court's wavering approach, by pacifying both sides, suc-
cessfully mediates or contributes to the mediation of the
conflicts arising in this era. In my view it is too early to
tell, since the outcome of the forces currently at play is
still in doubt. What can be said is that despite the fact
that this society is undergoing a period of economic insta-
bility, it is nevertheless experiencing relative social stabil-
ity, compared with, for example, the civil rights, Vietnam
War, and Watergate eras. And it may be that the Su-
preme Court's middle-of-the-road approach, although
leaving the injustices of United States-style democratic
capitalism intact, has contributed to that stability at least
for the time being.
Ethnic minorities - With respect to the protection of
ethnic minorities, while still condemning governmentally
promoted segregation, the Court has set some limits on
the remedial front." After an early Burger Court deci-
sion (attributable in part to the Warren Court holdovers)
sanctioning forced busing as a school desegregation mea-
sure,91 the Court ruled against cross-district busing into
suburbia, thus enabling more affluent whites to escape
integration.9" The Court also held that new desegregation
onomics, 96 SOCIALIST REV. 87 (1987); Frug, The City as a
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980). Nonetheless,
the states' rights movement is not comparable in the context of
United States-style democratic capitalism. The success of so-
cialist decentralization depends on a society generally struc-
tured along egalitarian lines. Decentralized decision-making in
this society, by contrast, given its great disparities in wealth and
power, is likely to further enhance the position of the power
elite and to further isolate the disadvantaged.
90. Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973);
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 529 (1979);
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
91. Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
92. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (cross district
remedy requires proof of governmental discrimination causing
interdistrict segregation). Interdistrict relief based on such
proof was affirmed by the Court in Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F.
Supp. (D. Del. 1975), affirmed, 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
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measures are not require*d if resegregation results from
private rather than government action (i.e., from white
flight, either to suburbia or to private schools). 93 At the
same time, perhaps as an effort to pacify, the Court up-
held court-ordered state funding of remedial and special
education programs as part of a desegregation plan when
integration is.unachievable due to white flight.94
Here again we see the public-private distinction used,
not as in the Lochner and civil rights eras to prevent gov-
ernment regulation of business and of sexual activity, but
to relieve the government of responsibility for rectifying
so-called private acts of racism. (In fact, there is no sub-
stantive difference between collective discrimination
through the government and discrimination resulting
from the tacit collective action involved in massive white
flight."5) On a doctrinal level there is a conflict here be-
tween two liberal values: the individual right to be
treated as an equal, and the individual right to freedom
of choice. Since liberal theory, while revering individual
choice, morally disapproves of racially biased private
choices, there has been an attempt to white-wash white
flight. It is not racism which motivates white flight, but
the desire to live in a nicer neighborhood, to advance, to
better one's self and one's family -- all of which flows
from the liberal value of individual initiative. But this
only exposes the underlying economics of white flight.
For it is the great wealth disparity between the white and
minority communities which makes white flight possible,
and it is the institutionalized racism of United States-
style democratic capitalism which causes the wealth dis-
parity. In short, the public and the private are so inextri-
cably intertwined that the distinction is meaningless, at
least in the context of mass private action and race.
The consequence of the Burger Court's desegregation
rulings is th'e new separate and unequal: white flight to
suburbia and private schools leaving minorities and some
disadvantaged whites trapped in central cities where edu-
cation is inferior both because of segregation and of the
cities' declining tax bases caused by white flight. The
positive side of this has been community control - more
minority elected officials and minorities running minority
institutions. And given the institutional racism which in-
fects the system, perhaps community control is preferable
to continuing to push for integration. But it is a no-win
93. Pasadena Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S.
424 (1976).
94. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
95. Compare Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972) (ruling that there was no state action violative of equal
protection in granting liquor license to private organization en-
gaging in racial discrimination). Whatever the merits of Moose
Lodge may be, the government is much more heavily involved
in facilitating white flight, as in housing and highway programs,
than the relatively small scale practices involved in Moose
Lodge. For critiques of the state action doctrine, see Brest,
State Action and Liberal Theory: A Critique of Flagg Brothers
v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296 (1982); Casebeer, Toward a
Critical Jurisprudence - A First Step by Way of the Public-
Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. MIAMi L. REV.
379 (1983).
situation, since due to institutionalized racism neither
continued efforts to integrate nor community control will
yield equality for Blacks and other disadvantaged minori-
ties. Only fundamental changes in the political, bureau-
cratic, and economic institutions of United States-style
democratic capitalism could bring that about. This im-
plies that egalitarian socialism is a necessary if not suffi-
cient condition for a racist-free society.
Fundamental economic restructuring, however, is a
move the Supreme Court has assiduously avoided, and
could probably not accomplish anyway beyond a limited
degree due to the various factors constraining it from ini-
tiating such changes. Several Burger Court decisions are
on point. For example, after an early ruling (attributable
really to the Warren Court) requiring procedural safe-
guards before terminating welfare benefits,96 the Burger
Court has steadfastly refused to address the underlying
economics of institutionalized racism and the related eco-
nomics of poverty. The Court's unwillingness to address
the adequacy of welfare benefits,9" unequal school financ-
ing,98 and exclusionary zoning" amply demonstrates this
96. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring a
prior due process hearing). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969), a Warren Court decision overthrowing dura-
tional residency requirements for welfare benefits as wealth dis-
crimination violative of the fundamental right to travel. The
Court was at its most interventionist in the economics of pov-
erty in Goldberg and Shapiro. Yet it is noteworthy that the
Warren Court's unanimity in dismantling enforced segregation
broke down over issues of wealth discrimination. Even such lib-
eral justices as Warren and Black dissented in Shapiro, presag-
ing the Burger Court's hands-off attitude. On the Court's
greater willingness to address racial issues rather than wealth
issues, see Kleven, The Supreme Court, Race, and the Class
Struggle, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795 (1981).
97. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding
AFDC grant limitation for large families at less than standard
of need); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding
provision of lower percentage of need to AFDC than to other
welfare recipients). That Dandridge is also attributable largely
to the Warren Court, only Warren himself having yet departed,
indicates that even a more liberal Court than the Burger or
Rehnquist Courts might be reluctant to address issues involving
fundamental economic restructuring.
98. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that there was no equal protection
violation in state-designed system of public school financing de-
pendent on wealth of local districts). In Rodriguez the Court
came within one vote of declaring education to be a fundamen-
tal right. The consequence would have been to require states to
equalize the funding of public elementary and secondary educa-
tion rather than to continue their widespread reliance on local
financing, which due to the wealth differentials between local
districts has produced great disparities in funding to the disad-
vantage of minority and lower income students. If education
had been declared a fundamental right, then a minimum stan-
dard of living for everyone, and particularly the young, is but a
short step on an intellectual level. See Michelman, Forward: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). Yet even if it had intervened in Rodri-
guez, the Supreme Court would likely never take that step be-
cause of the dramatic impact on the economic system.
99. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (ruling that proof of racially dis-
criminatory purpose is necessary, racially disparate impact be-
ing insufficient, to make out equal protection violation); Warth
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refusal. On the other hand, perhaps again in an effort to
pacify both sides, it has given qualified approval to af-
firmative action measures; more readily accepting them
when legislatively sanctioned or voluntary or in remedia-
tion of purposeful discrimination, 100 but being more re-
luctant when discrimination is effectual or when nomi-
nally innocent whites stand to lose existing positions (as
against their losing the opportunity to obtain a vacant
slot). 01 Thus the Burger Court has been less willing to
v. Scian, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (requiring a particular excluded
housing project to gain standing to challenge exclusionary zon-
ing); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (holding that'
more rigorous approval requirements for public than for other
housing does not violate equal protection). Even if the Supreme
Court were willing to tackle the economics of poverty, it seems
likely that remedial constraints such as governmental and pub-
lic recalcitrance and avoidance tactics would greatly inhibit the
Court's ability to bring about the massive redistribution of
wealth and the economic restructuring necessary to solve the
problem. See A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1976). Thus, for example, if the
Court had intervened in Rodriguez and ordered equalized state
financing of public education, the legislature might simply have
refused to do so. If so, how could the Court realistically have
responded? In the alternative, the legislature might have pro-
vided equalized but drastically reduced funding for public edu-
cation, leaving the public schools to the disadvantaged while
middle and upper income people fled to private schools; or it
might have brought the poorer school districts up to the level of
the richer by cutting back on welfare programs benefiting the
same people, resulting in more education but less of other ne-
cessities. And if the Court were to attack that problem by re-
quiring a minimum standard of living, then the result might be
an inflationary spiral leaving the poor right where they were
before. (A few state courts have addressed the school financing
and exclusionary zoning issues, although I would argue with
only modest success due to the institutionalized nature of the
politics of poverty. See Kleven, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. at 847-57
(cited in note 96).)
100. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that a graduate school may take
ethnicity into account in admission process in the interest of
achieving diversity, although it may not set aside slots for par-
ticular ethnic groups); United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding collective bargaining
agreement reserving half of openings in in-plant craft-training
programs for Blacks until percentage of Black craft workers
commensurate with percentage in local labor force); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding set aside of ten per-
cent of Public Works Employment Act funds for minority busi-
nesses); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. E.E.O.C., 106 S.
Ct. 3019 (1986) (upholding court-ordered race-based affirma-
tive action hiring plan containing numerical goals and not lim-
ited to actual victims as remedy for past discrimination); Local
No. 93, International Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleve-
land, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986) (upholding consent decree con-
taining race-based promotion plan to remedy alleged past dis-
crimination). But compare, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (ruling requirement that 30 percent
of work under city construction contracts be subcontracted to
minority businesses violates equal protection absent showing of
past city or prime contractor discrimination).
101. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
561 (1984) (holding that enjoinment of seniority-based layoffs,
in order to prevent firing of minorities hired after whites pursu-
ant to consent decree requiring race-conscious hiring to remedy
alleged though denied past race discrimination, violates Title
VII); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 106 S. Ct. 1842
(1986) (ruling that collective bargaining agreement extending
prefereP~tial protection against layoffs to minority teachers with
order the government to act affirmatively to rectify injus-
tice than to accede to the compromises emanating from
the political and economic arenas. This is in contrast, and
perhaps in reaction, to the Lochner era when the Court
attempted unsuccessfully and to its detriment to block
the political process' mediation of the conflicts surround-
ing the rise of monopoly capital.
The conservative drift of the Burger Court was
largely the result of the conservative political drift in the
United States following the civil rights era - a drift re-
sulting in part from white backlash to the reforms of that
era and fueled as well by the economic downturn since
that time. This stage of United States-style democratic
capitalism is characterized by high unemployment, in-
creasing poverty, and widening wealth disparities; in
short, a time in a society in which the ideology of compe-
tition and individualism prevails for protecting one's own.
In such a society institutionalized racism ensures that the
brunt of hard times will be borne by others than the
white majority.0 2 And the election of conservative presi-
dents who appoint conservative justices ensures that the
Supreme Court will not do much to remedy institutional-
ized racism.' 0 3
One might hope for more activism from the Court,
and one day we may see it. And like the Warren Court's
activism against enforced segregation during the civil
rights era, future Court activism may again help stabilize
the system if, as it seems likely, a future racial-class
struggle should threaten its legitimacy. Realistically,
though, while it might make modest in-roads, even an ac-
tivist Court could not bring about the kind of affirmative
action necessary to eliminate institutionalized racism
from the fabric of United States-style democratic capital-
ism. This analysis, if correct, illustrates the ultimate limi-
tations on the Supreme Court's ability to function as an
less seniority than whites in order to maintain ethnic balance,
but without a finding of convincing evidence of prior Board dis-
crimination, violates equal protection).
102. On the relationship between monopoly capitalism and
racism, see P. Baran & P. Sweezy, MONOPOLOY CAPITAL at
249-80 (cited in note 23).
103. Compare Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrench-
ment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination
Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) ("the relatively
subordinate status of Blacks serves a stabilizing function in this
society," at 1362; "race consciousness seems to be at least as
important as legal consciousness in supporting the dominant or-
der," at 1381). While acknowledging the legitimizing and co-
opting aspect of liberal reform in that "liberal ideology absorbs,
redefines, and limits the language of protest," Crenshaw never-
theless -argues that "African-Americans cannot ignore the
power of legal ideology to counter some of the most repressive
aspects of racial domination." Id. at 1370. The gains of the
Civil Rights era certainly support this view. The question is
whether and what additional gains are achievable through the
"skillful use of the liberating potential of dominant ideology."
Id. at 1387. To the extent that racial and poverty issues have
become merged, as in welfare rights, school financing, and ex-
clusionary zoning, the thesis here is that we are not likely to see
much reform from the Supreme Court, at least for the time
being.
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The political process - In the area of voting rights,
while the "one-person-one-vote" rule is still intact, the
Burger Court did chip away at it by allowing some devia-
tion from equal population districts in furtherance of
competing values"' and by allowing several exemptions
from the rule. 10 5 Beyond that, despite a few activist rul-
ings, the Burger/Rehnquist Court has by and large been
reluctant to address the issue of effective political
participation.
One leading area of litigation has concerned multi-
member electoral districts, the impact of which can dilute
the voting strength of minority groups. This is particu-
larly true when the majority votes as a bloc, has diver-
gent interests from the minority, and refuses to respond
to minority interests. After an early ruling dissolving
multi-member state legislative districts which diluted the
vote of Blacks and Mexican-Americans (but without
clearly articulating a standard of proof) 06, the Burger
Court upheld a city council multi-member district
scheme which effectively diluted Black voting strength on
the ground that both the Constitution and the Voting
Rights Act require proof of purposeful discrimination.' 7
This is a very difficult burden to carry when government
practices are on their face ethnically neutral, since it is
easy to advance benign purposes in support of practices
actually prompted by racial animus. In so doing the
Court expressly rejected proportional representation as a
constitutional imperative, emphasizing the right to vote
as an individual and not a group right.'0 8 Only when
Congress subsequently amended the Voting Rights Act to
make clear its intent did the Court shift to the effects test
in vote dilution cases, 09 and only then with the reluctant
concurrence of the Court's conservative wing which still
favors a rigorous burden of proof even under the effects
test." o
104. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (holding 16.4
percent deviation regarding state legislature justified by "policy
of maintaining the integrity of political subdivision lines");
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (same with 9.9 per-
cent deviation); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (same
with 7.8 percent deviation); Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835
(1983) (ruling deviations under 10 percent are minor).
105. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (60 percent voter
approval requirement for bond issues); Lockport v. Citizens for
Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977) (separate majority
voter approval requirement with respect to adoption of new
count), charter); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (water storage district
elections limited to property owners with votes apportioned to
assessed valuation); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (one-
acre-one-vote regarding water reclamation district serving sev-
eral hundred thousand residents).
106. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
107. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Pur-
poseful discrimination was found regarding an at-large system
in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
108. 446 U.S. at 75-80.
109. Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986).
110. Under another section of the Voting Rights Act that
prohibits changes in voting procedures which abridge the right
to vote on account of ethnicity pursuant to a clearly expressed
effects test, the Burger Court allowed the annexation by a city
of a largely white outlying area. The effect was to substantially
dilute Black voting strength. In order to prevent this result, the
Two other voting rights areas in which the Burger
Court was unwilling to intervene concern politically bi-
ased gerrymandering of electoral districts"'. and laws in-
hibiting access to the ballot by minor parties.1 2 As to the
latter the Warren Court had initiated some reform. 18
The pattern in the Burger Court's voting rights cases,
then, displays a definite reluctance to break new ground,
but a willingness, if somewhat tentative, to sanction polit-
ical compromises. As with the protection of ethnic minor-
ities, this pattern is largely a holding action, though with
some moderation of earlier judicial reforms. One major
exception to this analysis was the Court's invalidation on
First Amendment grounds of all or part of laws regulat-
ing campaign financing1 and other political expendi-
tures." '5 At issue here again is a conflict between two
competing liberal values: on the one side the right,
founded in the ideology of individual worth, to an effec-
tive voice in the political process, and on the other side
the right, founded in the ideology of meritocracy and pri-
vate choice, to spend one's money on political causes as
one sees fit. The Voting Rights Act and campaign fi-
nance cases illustrate the overlapping roles of the Su-
preme Court and the political process as conflict
mediators. While the Supreme Court's hesitancy to vigor-
ously enforce the Voting Rights Act and its overriding of;
Court required that the city shift from an at-large to single-
member district city council assuring Blacks seats roughly
equivalent to their post-annexation share of the population. City
of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
111. Davis v. Bandemeer, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986) (rejecting
challenge to state legislative redistricting plan diluting Demo-
cratic voting strength); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735
(1973) (upholding redistricting of state legislature to achieve
rough approximation of statewide political strength of Demo-
cratic and Republican parties).
112. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767
(1974) (upholding against equal protection challenge the re-
quirement that minor parties hold nominating conventions and
obtain 10 percent voter signatures while major parties need only
have primary election); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431
(1971) (upholding special ballot access requirements applicable
to parties whose candidates received less than 20 percent of vote
in prior gubenatorial or presidential election). For a contrasting
opinion, see Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979) (invalidating requirement
of more signatures to qualify for ballot in Chicago than in
statewide elections).
113. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (invalidating
restrictive requirements for parties receiving less than 10 per-
cent of vote in prior presidential election, which made it "virtu-
ally impossible" for new party to be placed on ballot).
114. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act limits on individual and political
committee contributions to federal candidates, but prohibiting
limits on expenditures by candidates and campaigns); Federal
Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee, 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (invalidating expenditure lim-
its by independent political committees on behalf of presidential
candidates opting to receive public financing).
115. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair
Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (invalidating contri-
bution limits to committees supporting or opposing ballot mea-
sures); First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
(invalidating prohibition of corporate contributions or expendi-
tures regarding referenda).
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portions of the campaign finance laws undermine politi-
cal settlements and benefit the already politically domi-
nant, these statutes represent modest reforms at best.
The Voting Rights Act does enhance somewhat minority
political power on the state and local levels, thus pacify-
ing the minority community. It does not, however, alter
the overall political dominance of white voters nor of the
power elite.
The campaign finance laws were designed in part to
combat the erosion of public confidence in the political
process resulting from the Watergate scandal. If upheld
in their entirety they would have significantly inhibited
the monied elite's ability to directly impact the electoral
process, thus demonstrating a degree of autonomy of the
political process. But while the campaign finance laws
may have helped preserve the legitimacy of the system,
they would not have fundamentally altered the political
power of the monied elite, who have many other ways to
exercise their power. These methods include lobbying, in-
ducing employees to contribute, and providing non-cam-
paign contributions to political parties. Indeed, one of the
purposes of the campaign finance laws, as evidenced by
the public financing of presidential elections to the disad-
vantage of minor parties, 1 ' was to strengthen the politi-
cal dominance of the two major parties and therefore of
the power elite to whom the major parties are so inti-
mately tied. Only a fundamental restructuring of United
States-style democratic capitalism, so as to prevent the
amassing of great wealth and economic power in the
hands of an elite few, could truly democratize the politi-
cal process. That again is a move the Supreme Court
would likely never make and could not accomplish
anyway.
17
116. Major party presidential candidates receive $20 mil-
lion (adjusted for inflation); minor parties (5% to 25% of the
vote in the prior election) receive an amount proportional to
their share of the vote in the prior or current election, which-
ever is higher; and other parties qualify for proportional subsi-
dies only retroactively if they receive more than 5% of the vote
in the current election. Minor parties must be on the ballot in
at least ten states to qualify. These provisions seriously disad-
vantage minor party candidates. Candidates seeking presiden-
tial nomination in party primary elections are entitled to match-
ing funds provided they raise $5,000 in each of twenty states.
This disadvantages parties not in a position to run primary elec-
tions, which serve as a crucial means of gaining exposure to the
electorate; it also disadvantages lesser known candidates in the
major parties. The Court upheld this scheme against an equal
protection challenge. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93-108 (cited in note
114).
117. It might be good to summarize at this point some of
the reasons why the power elite is able to predominate in the
political process despite the universalization of the franchise.
One basic reason is that money and economic power talk. In
this era of mass media access to money is more important polit-
ically than ever. Money buys votes and facilitates lobbying. By
pooling their resources those with money can organize them-
selves for effective political action, while those without money
remain atomized and lack comparable means of coordination.
Since everyone's well-being depends on the economy, the domi-
nation of monopoly capitalists, gives credence to the notion that
what's good for General Motors is good for the United States.
A second reason is that the system is structured so as to
minimize the political power of the masses. The two party sys-
tem, which is bolstered by districting and winner-take-all elec-
Sexual liberty - Of the areas in which the Warren
Court advanced individual rights, this is the one in which
the Burger Court remained most activist. The leading
case, of course, was Roe v. Wade, decided early on by the
Burger Court and subsequently buttressed by rulings
striking down a variety of legislative attempts to under-
mine it."s Furthermore, the Court assured women con-
trol over their bodies and undercut male domination with
decisions invalidating laws and regulations discriminating
against nonmarital children," 9 disallowing pregnant
teachers to work,2 and treating women employees less
favorably than men under various welfare state pro-
grams."' At the same time, the Burger Court was cer-
tions, fosters mainstream thinking, inhibits the expression of di-
vergent and destabilizing views within the political process, and
delegitimizes those views (even to the point of justifying their
suppression) when they are put forth outside the political pro-
cess. Moreover, the fruits of political power, i.e., control of the
government, are undercut through federalism and checks-and-
balances which disperse power and thereby weaken government.
In addition, the privatization of the economy depoliticizes eco-
nomic issues to a great degree by delegitimizing government in-
tervention except in the case of demonstrable market failures.
And when government does intervene to manage the economy,
usually for the benefit of monopoly capital, issues are de-
politicized by assigning their handling to a bureaucracy which
is somewhat insulated from the political process.
Third, the masses are also depoliticized by the hegemony of
monopoly capital's supportive individualistic ideology (e.g., the
natural right to private property, personal responsibility for suc-
cess or failure in life), and by the fostered illusion that contem-
porary politics involves complex technical issues beyond the
competence of the masses. The weak link in all this is the threat
to the system's legitimacy which results when economic and
other crises demonstrate that both the private market and the
political process institutionalize inequality, hierarchy, domina-
tion and exploitation. On depoliticization under and threats to
the legitimacy of advanced capitalism, see J. Habermas, TO-
WARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY AT 50-82 (1968) and LEGITIMA-
TION CRISIS (1973).
118. Compare, for example, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973) (performance of first trimester abortions may not be
limited to hospital); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating required consent of
spouse and parental consent if under eighteen years old); City
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S.
416 (1983) (invalidating limitation on performance of second
trimester abortions to hospital, required counseling by attending
physician, and 24 hour waiting period).
119. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (state's failure
to require support for nonmarital children while requiring natu-
ral father to support legitimate children violates equal protec-
tion); New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411
U.S. 619 (1973) (state welfare program effectively denying to
nonmarital children benefits extended to legitimate children vio-
lates equal protection); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977) (invalidating exclusion of nonmarital children from in-
testate succession to father's estate). For a contrasting opinion
see, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding nonmarital
child's right to intestate succession from natural father only
upon court determined paternity during father's lifetime).
120. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974).
121. Frontierro v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (mili-
tary benefits for dependents); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975) (Social Security Act benefits to surviving
spouse).
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tainly not an unabashed supporter of women's rights, and
issued several rulings which help perpetuate women's
subordination. An example is the decision upholding the
denial of public funding for abortions, 22 thereby seri-
ously interfering with the practical ability of a disfavored
and powerless class of women, i.e., indigents, to exercise
their rights under Roe. Another such ruling upheld the
exclusion of pregnancy from a state administered disabil-
ity insurance program,1 23 thereby forcing mothers to
compromise family and employment values more so than
fathers.
These variations are due less to doctrinal differences
than to the Court's attempt to mediate this on-going and
controversial dispute by accommodating the interests of
the competing sides sufficiently to defuse potential up-
heaval. Thus, the opponents of abortion may receive some
solace from the knowledge that their tax dollars will not
fund what they regard as murder, while those Supreme
Court decisions favorable to women may help convince
feminists that some progress is being made despite the
defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment and the continu-
ing second-class status of women in the United States.
From the vantage point of defusing disputes which
threaten the system's legitimacy, the Burger Court's han-
dling of the sexual liberty issue as it relates to women's
rights seems to have been fairly successful. It is prema-
ture, though, to draw final conclusions. For not only is
male domination still a fact of life in the United States,
but new appointments to the Supreme Court may soon
produce a reversal of Roe and perhaps of other pro femi-
nist rulings, thereby ending Supreme Court accommoda-
tion. 124 Moreover, like racism and classism, sexism is so
tightly woven into the fabric of United States-style demo-
cratic capitalism that even a highly activist pro women's
rights Supreme Court could not produce full equality for
women. In a society fraught with and based on inequal-
ity, it serves men's interests to keep women in a
subordinate position. A prerequisite to full equality for
women is a more fundamental restructuring of society
122. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Medicaid);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (same).
123. Geduldig v Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). See also Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (exclusion of
pregnancy from non-occupational sickness and accident benefits
plan does not violate Title VII). Compare California Federal
Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. 683 (1987)
(state statute requiring employers to provide leave to and rein-
statement of employees disabled by pregnancy is not preempted
by Title VII).
124. 124 As for the rights of gays, the Burger Court has
taken a hard-line non-accommodationist position, holding in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) that sodomy laws
do not violate gays' fundamental right to privacy. Since few
people care what others do behind closed doors, this would have
been an easy case for the Court to take a stand against the
widespread official harassment of gays in the United States.
Having declined to do so the Court is now in the position of
having to say either that the common sexual practices of hetero-
sexual couples in this country are also unprotected, thereby of-
fending the bulk of the public, or that gay sexual practices may
be singled out for punitive treatment, thereby undercutting the
myth of equality before the law.
along egalitarian lines than the Supreme Court could
ever bring about.
Summary - Although the contradictions of United
States-style democratic capitalism are as apparent as
ever, the individual rights pullback of the Burger/Rehn-
quist Court has come at a time when the level of conflict
arising from these contradictions has moderated, particu-
larly as compared with the civil rights era. This modera-
tion is the result in part perhaps of the Warren and early
Burger Court reforms, and of the political reforms in-
duced at least in part by an era of judicial activism on
behalf of individual rights. Also there may be a cyclical
dynamic to periods of intense conflict and moderation,
similar to economic up-swings and down-swings. In any
event, during periods of moderation the stability and le-
gitimacy of the system are not as threatened as in periods
of intense conflict. There is less of a need then for the
Supreme Court to be actively reformist in its role as me-
diator.125 Indeed, reformist activism at such times risks
causing instability. Thus the Burger/Rehnquist Court's
relative passivity to individual rights claims, though ob-
jectionable from a humanistic perspective, may at least
temporarily serve its overriding purpose of helping to sus-
tain the system. In the long run, however, if, as appears
likely, the Court's conservative drift continues, this may
well prove self-defeating by contributing to the widening
wealth disparities and class polarization which character-
ize this neo-conservative era. These social conditions
seem likely to explode in the not too distant future into
social upheaval. As humanists we must abhor this suffer-
ing. As radicals we must seize the opportunity it provides
to expose the system's contradictions and work for funda-
mental social change.
CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court was obviously intended to
be a dispute resolver of some type, this does not necessa-
rily mean that it was consciously designed as a relatively
autonomous mediator in the form set forth here. Nor
does it mean that the Supreme Court justices view their
role as such or that they do not really believe the doctrine
they espouse. For institutions and ideas often have histor-
ical implications not fully contemplated by their creators.
Nor does the Court always resolve disputes in ways
which help sustain United States-style democratic capi-
talism. For apart from the fallibility of the justices and
the other factors influencing their decisions, the system
has its built-in contradictions which may at some point
prove irreconcilable without more fundamental change
than the Supreme Court with its limited power is capable
125. Compare, Clune, Book Review: Courts and Legislators
as Arbitrators of Social Change, 93 YALE L.J. 763 (1984) (ar-
guing that the judiciary tends to be more activist when the leg-
islative process breaks down as an arbitrator of social change,
and more passive when the legislative process functions
effectively).
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of fomenting.
There are signs that the era of prosperity which has
so far sustained United States-style democratic capital-
ism may be ending. Technology has begun to yield dimin-
ishing returns and to create more problems than it solves,
more and more third-world countries are breaking free of
imperialist domination, and competition among capitalist
nations has become more intense. In the United States
we see declining wages and increasing unemployment
among the very workers who have supported the system,
along with rising poverty and widening wealth disparities.
These conditions are caused by the inability of the system
to make the pie grow continually larger, and by the abil-
ity of those with more power to use their greater eco-
nomic and political strength to retain or enhance their
share at the expense of the masses. Whether it will be
possible to revitalize United States-style democratic capi-
talism remains to be seen. If not, many may come to see
the ideology which has helped sustain the system as the
myth it really is. Once the fragile consensus on which the
legitimacy of the system depends breaks down, there will
be little the Supreme Court can do or say to change that.
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